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Promoting Democracy Abroad
Report of the Task Force on Peace and Security
United Nations Association/National Capital Area
October 2005
Alan J. Dillingham
AJD International
Rapporteur
Introduction. From November 2004 to June 2005, the UNA/NCA Task force on Peace and Security examined the policy of democracy promotion abroad. The task force held five sessions and heard from a number of speakers. Dick Rowson, a co-chairman of the task force and president of the Council for a Community of Democracies spoke on the origins and activities of the Community of Democracies and the creation of a UN Democracy Caucus. Jennifer Windsor, executive Director of Freedom House, spoke on democratic trends and democracy promotion around the world. Ambassador Mark Palmer gave a presentation based on his book Breaking the Real Axis of Evil, outlining his recommendations for eliminating the world’s remaining dictatorships. Lt. General William Odom, former director of the National Security Agency and author of America’s Inadvertent Empire, spoke on the dangers of promoting democracy. Ambassador Jonathan Dean, chairman of the task force, also spoke on the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.
Differing viewpoints arose from these task force discussions, as for example the exchange of views between General Odom, who opposed “democracy promotion,” and the other members of the task force. Central to the disagreement was the relationship between liberalism and democracy. All sides agreed that “liberal regimes inexorably become more democratic.” The corollary, “that democratic regimes become more liberal,” was a source of contention. General Odom argued that regimes that have the trappings of a democracy in a representative sense are not necessarily liberal, i.e. ensure property rights and rule of law. Because of that, Odom contended that promoting liberalism ought to be the primary focus, since it would ultimately result in democracy. The rest of the task force agreed that elections were only one component of democracy; however they were not ready to forsake the promotion of elections until a regime had liberal characteristics. They argued that promotion of democracy entails encouraging both free elections and other trappings such as a free press and liberalism. While acknowledging the dangers of elections without established liberalism, some worried that it might be wrong to deny the human right to choose one’s own leaders until that point. Questions arising from the debate would include: How strong is the link between liberalism and democracy (alternatively, democracy and liberalism)? Can liberalism and democracy be separated? Is liberalism a necessary precursor to democracy? Will illiberal democracies become liberal? Are illiberal democracies any safer internally or externally than authoritarian states? Answers to these questions have consequences on methods and the direction of democracy promotion. The full report of the task force follows.
Democracy promotion must include more than free elections. What is the definition of “democracy” in the current context? What are its defining characteristics? The task force spent a good deal of time grappling with these questions.
Dick Rowson pointed out that democracy is much more than free elections. It involves establishing a structure of multi-party and multi-candidate elections; freedom of expression and association and freedom of the press – both essential to the holding of meaningful, free elections; an independent judiciary capable of enforcing the rule of law; a legislature accountable to the people with powers separate from the executive and the judiciary; and respect for human rights by the promotion of tolerance and a pluralistic society.
General Odom argued that there is a contemporary tendency to conflate democracy (elections and political participation) and liberalism (property rights, rule of law, etc.) He argued instead that the two should be treated separately and that efforts should be focused on promoting liberalism rather than democracy.
For the most part, task force members were not as concerned as General Odom about conflating democracy and liberalism, although they appreciated the emphasis he placed on the rule of law. As a practical matter, free elections, respect for basic human rights and the rule of law are really inseparable. All are, and should be, considered indispensable elements of democracy promotion. In this broader view, elections are a necessary, but not sufficient, component of a democracy. Human rights and the rule of law are also necessary components, and there was a general feeling that they are probably more fundamental than holding elections.
Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World survey provides a useful tool for defining and measuring democracy and democratic trends in the world today. The survey uses an extensive list of criteria covering political rights and civil liberties, derived in large measure from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to evaluate countries and judge them as “free,” “partly free,” or “not free” on a scale of 1.0 to 7.0, with 1.0 being the most free. The survey also provides individual detailed narratives that provide a more textured view of the state of democracy for each of the 192 countries in the survey.
The task force also noted a potential tension between liberalism and democracy. Free markets can create concentrations of economic power that lead in turn to concentrations of political power that can warp democratic processes and eventually corrupt liberal institutions as well. Some type of economic safeguards might be needed, therefore, to preserve democratic systems.
Democracy promotion can be an effective method of increasing global security. Will democracy promotion lead to greater international security? In his second inaugural address in January 2005, President Bush emphatically stated his support for the affirmative view, declaring that “(t)he best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.” Ambassador Mark Palmer pointed out in his remarks that dictatorial regimes certainly pose a threat to international security. Palmer argued that due to dictators, the 20th century was the bloodiest in human history. Dictators were not only responsible for aggression against their neighbors; they posed an even greater threat to their own populations. Noting the phenomenon of “democide”, Palmer stated that in the twentieth century dictators had killed three times more people within their own countries then had had been killed in the century’s wars. When combined with the dangers of nuclear proliferation, the world’s 43 remaining dictators pose a particularly worrying threat.
General Odom offered a contrasting view in his remarks, arguing that attempts to spread democracy might actually undermine global security. The historical process by which liberal democracies come about tends to be violent. Liberal democratic states do not arise from democratic elections but from “liberal breakthroughs” -- situations where competing elites have fought a civil war to the point of exhaustion, then adopted a set of rules protecting private property, and governing who makes rules and how the rules themselves can be changed. States which emphasize democracy before liberalism tend to become “illiberal democracies” characterized by a good deal of internal instability. Liberal regimes inexorably become democratic, Odom argued, but illiberal democracies rarely become liberal.
Odom argued that current efforts to extend democracy in the Middle East underestimated the difficulties in establishing liberal regimes, and were more likely to produce illiberal regimes than peace and stability. He also argued that continued operations in Iraq were resulting in American overstretch, and thus undermining American power, which he viewed as a more important pillar of global security than the spread of democracy.
Task force members took issue with Odom’s argument on a number of points. First off, he seemed to set the bar for what constitutes liberal democracy too high, especially when compared with the more rigorous analysis done by Freedom House. Second, Odom’s argument gave the impression that it is desirable to promote liberalism without democracy. But in practical terms, they’re intertwined in today’s world and Odom himself notes that liberal regimes inexorably become more democratic. The issue then seems to be less about whether to promote democracy but how – what sequence of events are most likely to create liberal democracies. Many task force members would agree with Odom that holding elections without the rule of law or the protection of basic human rights would not be wise, but would also consider the opportunity to choose one’s leaders as a basic human right.
A high degree of dissonance has undermined the effectiveness of the Bush Administration’s policy of democracy promotion. Has the Bush Administration helped or harmed the cause of democracy promotion? In his second Inaugural Address, President Bush set the promotion of democracy at the center of American foreign policy: “America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one. . . . So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” At the Organization of American States meeting in June 2005, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called on OAS member states to create mechanisms to monitor implementation of the 2001 OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter.
Iraq lies at the center of the Bush Administration’s democracy promotion efforts. This poses a number of complications. First, as long as the insurgency survives the ultimate success of the whole project remains in question. Second, in prosecuting the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism, the Bush Administration showed a shocking disdain for international law and the norms governing the treatment of prisoners. The hostility to the International Criminal Court, the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, and the failure to hold anyone in a senior position of responsibility accountable for them, leave the Administration’s support for democracy open to question. Third, the United States has ignored or glossed over human rights abuses by allies in the war on terrorism, such as Russia, Uzbekistan and Pakistan, while continuing to rail against North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela. This selective approach to human rights and democracy have led many in the world to view the Administration’s emphasis on democracy as a front for its own imperialist designs.
Nevertheless, the fall of Saddam Hussein, the January 2005 elections and the submission to Iraqi voters in October 2005 of a constitution containing significant compromises designed to ensure a fair measure of Sunni power has increased Sunni participation in negotiations over Iraq’s political future and should certainly be seen as positive steps forward. There is also evidence that these developments are provoking broader change throughout the Middle East. Small signs of change are evident in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The new Palestinian leader, Abu Mazen, has committed himself to institutional reform and non-violent confrontation with Israel. The most dramatic events have occurred in Lebanon, where the United States cooperated closely with France in the UN Security Council to successfully press Syria to end its military occupation there. However, the strong showing in recent elections by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon is a stark reminder of Odom’s point about illiberal democracies.
It is also unclear whether or not the Bush Administration will be able to cooperate productively within the United Nations. Its leadership role within the Community of Democracies (CD) and the establishment by the CD of the UN Democracy Caucus at the 2004 UN General Assembly Session not withstanding, US failure to obtain Security Council backing for the invasion of Iraq has generated a legacy of mutual mistrust between itself and other UN members. Bush Administration officials have been articulating a desire to return the UN to its original founding principles, in language that is strikingly parallel to that used by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. However, naming John Bolton, an aggressive and vocal critic, as ambassador to the UN raises serious questions about the true nature of the Administration’s objectives.
The US has also undertaken the restructuring of its foreign assistance programs to emphasize democracy promotion. The Millennium Challenge Account, established in 2004, provides development assistance to countries meeting eligibility criteria in the areas of democratic governance, investments in human development, and the promotion of economic freedoms. The President’s FY2006 budget request proposes $3 billion for the MCA, an increase of $1.5 billion over the level Congress appropriated for FY2005. The request also includes the rather low figure of $120 million for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) for reform efforts in the Middle East, including promotion of a Middle East Foundation, a Middle East Free Trade Area, and political party and legislative strengthening. $80 million has also been requested for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which makes grants to private organizations to strengthen democratic institutions, the rule of law, human rights, civic education, and a free press. This represents a $20 million increase over FY2005 and comes on top of a doubling of the NED budget in that fiscal year. The request also includes a second $10 million contribution for a UN Democracy Fund, proposed by President Bush at the UN General Assembly last fall, to provide technical assistance to countries adopting democratic reforms. In FY 2005, the US pledged $10 million to the Fund, matching $10 million contributed by India. The US also strongly supported the new International Centre for Democratic Transition in Budapest, which was endorsed by the Community of Democracies at its Biennial Ministerial Conference in Santiago, April 2005. However, as Susan Rice of the Brookings Institution points out, the President’s budget request also cuts $32.7 million from USAID’s global democracy account, the State Department’s global human rights and democracy fund and regional democracy funds for Africa, Asia and the Middle East channeled through the NED.
The task force was generally supportive of many of Ambassador Palmer’s recommendation for promoting democracy, which have been included in legislation introduced in March in the House (H.R. 1133) by Representatives Wolf and Lantos, and in the Senate (S. 516) by Senators McCain and Lieberman. The ADVANCE Democracy Act would establish a special assistant to the president for democracy promotion within the National Security Council, and an undersecretary for democracy promotion, an Office of Democratic Movements and Transitions and a Democracy Promotion and Human Rights Advisory Board within the State Department. The legislation would also require democracy and human rights promotion training for foreign service officers.
Democracy promotion should be an international effort. The United States is not alone in its efforts to promote democracy. The Task Force spent a good deal of time examining the activities of the Community of Democracies. The Community of Democracies is an intergovernmental organization whose members are committed to the consolidation and expansion of democracy around the world. The Community was established at the Warsaw Conference in June 2000 as a result of an initiative undertaken by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. 106 countries sent representatives to the conference and endorsed the Warsaw Declaration, affirming their commitment to strengthen and promote democratic values and practices. Participants agreed to meet biennially at the foreign minister level, and a nongovernmental forum was also established in parallel with the intergovernmental organization. In 2004, the Community of Democracies agreed to act in concert within the United Nations to promote democracy by formally organizing the UN Democracy Caucus.
The Third Biennial Conference of the Community of Democracies met in Santiago, Chile in April 2005. Government representatives established a new mechanism to work more collaboratively with nongovernmental organizations to promote democracy globally. As stated earlier, the Santiago conference also supported the establishment of the International Center for Democratic Transition in Budapest, undertaken by the Hungarian government, to provide practical assistance to democratizing countries and apply political pressure on countries not democratizing. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice addressed the opening plenary session of the Santiago Conference, reflecting the importance the Bush Administration placed on the Community of Democracies’ work. On the negative side of the ledger, however, the continued inclusion of Russia as a full participant in the Community, despite its democratic backsliding, threatens the organization’s credibility.
The UN and its affiliated agencies face a handicap in the area of democratic promotion in that they cannot openly criticize their non-democratic members. Nevertheless, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed the Community of Democracies at the Warsaw Conference and endorsed its goals as being in line with the founding principles of the United Nations. In March 2005, Annan presented his own report on UN reform, entitled In Larger Freedom, which criticized the misuse of the UN Commission on Human Rights by non-democratic states seeking to protect themselves from criticism. Annan proposed transforming the Commission into a new UN Human Rights Council, that would be elected directly by the General Assembly and consist of members pledged to uphold human rights standards. Annan also noted the UN’s work promoting democracy through its concrete support for elections in several countries, its emphasis on good governance in development programs, and its role rebuilding the rule of law in war-torn countries. Annan also encouraged member states to support President Bush’s call for a UN Democracy Fund at the UN General Assembly in September 2004.
In his report, Annan argued that because human rights and democracy were inextricably linked to security and development, UN member states should take the opportunity presented by the UN General Assembly meeting in September 2005 to strengthen collective security and develop a truly global development strategy, in addition to promoting human rights in democracy. He pointed out that “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear,” which President Franklin Roosevelt had called for in his famous Four Freedoms speech, are integral parts of the “larger freedom” called for in the UN Charter.
Cautious optimism is appropriate when assessing the prospects for democracy promotion. General Odom’s description of liberal institutions makes it more understandable why more formal democracies fail. However, task force members rejected Odom’s pessimistic view that the prospects were slim for increasing the number of liberal democracies over his present total of 22, in favor of Freedom House’s more optimistic findings that global trends showed a continuing increase in the number of “free” countries in its evaluation and a decrease in the number of “unfree” countries. According to Freedom House, in 1900, there were no states that could be considered electoral democracies in the sense of free elections with universal suffrage and competitive multi-party systems. In 1950 there were 43 such democracies and in 2000 there were 120 electoral democracies. Just a partial list of democratic transitions in the last 30 years provides reason for optimism: Spain, Portugal and Greece in the 1970s; most of Latin American, the Philippines and South Korea in the 1980s; much of Central Europe, South Africa and other African nations and Indonesia in the 1990s; Georgia and Ukraine in the first decade of the 21st century. Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, there appears to be a high correlation between the spread of democracy, increased prosperity and a reduction of violence from international conflict and civil wars.
Freedom House also finds that there does not seem to be an insuperable conflict between the values of Islam and democratic government. Although there are no democratic regimes in the Arab world and only two countries with Muslim majorities are characterized as “free”, roughly half of the world’s Muslim population actually lives under democratically elected governments in places such as India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Turkey, and Nigeria, as well as in Western Europe and North America.
International factors seem to play a large role in the spread of democracy, especially since the end of the Cold War. The prospect of NATO and EU membership undoubtedly created strong incentives for democratic reform in Central Europe during the 1990s. The EU continues to work for the world-wide spread of democracy and the US should work closely with it. Increasingly global financial markets have a tendency to reward states that have put in place such basic building blocks of democracy as transparency, rule of law and protection of property rights. International donors also increasingly insist on “good governance” as a prerequisite for assistance. However, globalization seems to be a double-edged sword, rewarding states with good governance and punishing states that do not successfully adapt. Thus while globalization may be responsible for the spread of democracy in part, it can also be seen as exacerbating the problems of failed states. In some way, the terrorist attacks of September 11 can be seen as a result of the Middle East region’s failure to meet the challenges of globalization and democratization.
Thus efforts to promote democracy world-wide cannot and should not be separated from the problems of development and international security, as Kofi Annan argues in his report In Larger Freedom. In the medium-term, the prospects for spreading democracy will depend on whether or not the Bush Administration can work effectively in partnership with other nations through the United Nations to enhance collective security, promote development and ensure democratic government. The UN Democracy Caucus could enhance these prospects, if used properly. Indeed, the Caucus met at the UN General Assembly on September 19 with over 70 UN member countries in attendance to develop a strategy for implementing the Millennium Development Goals and the Outcomes Document on UN reform approved by the General Assembly the previous week.
We see a need for more reflection on this subject for a coherent global strategy for democracy promotion and program of international cooperation with adequate financing motivated by the understanding that this program will have to be continued for many decades. We also need to identify how more effective concerted action among democratic nations in the Community of Democracies and its UN Democracy Caucus can be realized, perhaps involving a supplementary international center in addition to CD to lead this activity giving it impetus and focus over a long period. G-8 minus Russia is one possibility. An essential conclusion about promoting democracy is that there is nothing permanent about democracy for those fortunate enough to have it now. Democracy has to be worked for everyday.
Other Resources
* Council for a Community of Democracies
http://www.ccd21.org
* Freedom House
http://www.freedomhouse.org
* Campaign for a UN Democracy Caucus
http://www.democracycaucus.net
* 2004 State Dept. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004
* Carnegie Endowment Project on Democracy and the Rule of Law
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/programs/global/
index.cfm?fa=proj&id=101
* US Institute of Peace Rule of Law program
http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw
* Amnesty International
http://www.amnesty.org
* Carter Center
http://www.cartercenter.org
* Human Rights Watch
http://www.hrw.org
* Campaign for a UN Democracy Caucus
http://www.democracycaucus.net
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