The Universal Periodic Mechanism (UPR) in the Human Rights Council
The following is a CCD summary and analysis of the Universal Periodic Mechanism of the Human Rights Council, according to coverage by ReformtheUN.org (http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php/eupdate/2883).

In a February 8th, 2007, special feature on the Human Rights Council, ReformtheUN.org writes that the “Council aims to start conducting reviews in its second year (which begins in June 2007).”  In order to begin the review process the Council needs to develop guidelines on how the UPR will function, how it will evaluate countries, how often, etc. The Council has formed a Working Group to discuss “the future modalities of the UPR, with the participation of states, observer states and NGOs.” However, the Working Group has yet to come to any consensus or decisions about the UPR. The issues on which there is divergence between the member-states and the fact that is there no final decisions about the UPR process is a telling sign that the Council may not be the strong human rights institution and enforcer that it was designed to be.
Important issues of contention:

1. Should the review process include input from NGOs and other groups or should the process be solely intergovernmental?
2. Should special treatment be given to developing states?
3. How should the review be conducted? Fact-finding missions, investigative teams, etc.
4. How is the final decision made? Consensus or unanimity?
5. Who, if anyone, should be in charge of follow-up?
6. Should outside actors “play a role in the implementation of UPR outcomes”?

Special Treatment
One of the most important issues of contention was “whether the UPR should take into account the level of development and specificities of countries.” Meaning, should a country’s developing status preclude it from as thorough of an investigation? This issue was brought up again when trying to decide how often countries should be reviewed. Some states thought that “reviews should differ depending on countries level of development. Pakistan suggested for developed countries to be reviewed every three years while developing countries should undergo review every seven years.”
States that supported this argument, such as Nigeria and Bangladesh, “stressed the developing countries need longer cycles of review as a natural consequence of their capacity to take on reporting burdens as well as to implement the Council’s recommendations. Other states opposed this argument stating that equal treatment should apply at all times.”

Our analysis: While giving developing countries special treatment in order to ease costs is considerate, it could also give them more leeway for human rights and democracy abuses. If the Council truly believes that human rights are universal, why be more lax on some countries than others? And it can be argued that developing countries need more frequent reviews of their human rights records because they may not have a strong background in democracy and human rights or a history of relatively recent abuses.  It seems like if this leniency is given, the Council will lose credibility and be no more respected that the Commission, the organization it replaced for having members with dubious human rights records.

Make-up of the Review Panels
Another issue of contention is regarding the inclusion of NGOs, “National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), and other specialized agencies,” in the review process. Some states, such as Pakistan, Algeria, and Iran, want the review process to exclude these groups and be kept at the intergovernmental level.  Other states, such as the UK, “pointed at the potential politicization that an explicitly intergovernmental approach could create, as was the case with the Commission of Human Rights.”   
In addition, there is a question about who should review the countries’ human rights records: regional groups, friends of the country, human right experts, etc. Neither the US (who is not a member of the Council, however) nor Algeria wanted experts to conduct the review.

Our analysis: To fully evaluate the human rights records of the members all organizations with knowledge and expertise should be allowed to give input into the review. We believe that the organizations on the ground (NGOs, NHRIs), rather than national governments, will have a more accurate—and possibly more unbiased—account of the potential human rights abuses. Additionally, we think that the UK is correct in its assessment that making the process intergovernmental runs the risk of politicizing the Council, just like what happened with the Commission.

Conclusions
The Working Groups have yet to come to a consensus on the UPR process. We believe that this difficulty in coming to an agreement of how the members will be evaluated shows that the states have very different expectations and ideas about the Council. Unless the process can be confirmed in the next Working Group meeting, which the article said “appears unlikely,” the Council will have little legitimacy because it cannot even evaluate its own members for adherence to human rights. Although the election process to the Council is more selective, without being able to create a litmus test for its own members, the Council can hardly be expected to come to consensus or decision on potential human rights abuses around the world.  As of now, the Council does not appear, to us, to be a very strong protector of human rights.