Robert Hunter Advocates Strategic Plans for Iraq and Afghanistan
November 27, 2006

Robert Hunter, Chairman of CCD, Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation, and former US Ambassador to NATO, has recently authored two articles advocating cooperation between NATO and the EU in rebuilding Afghanistan.  His article “A Grand Strategy for Iraq” was published November 19, 2006, by The San Diego Union Tribune and the article “EU Should Put Up or Shut Up in Afghanistan” is currently under review.

Hunter recommends a five-point plan for ameliorating tensions in Iraq, which include  working towards bringing functional self-governance to Iraq, easing tensions between Israel and Palestine, and creating a “new regional security system,” to help keep the peace and stability.  This strategic regional organization, however, would need to be original and could not be merely a Middle Eastern copy of NATO; he suggests that it be “a system based first and foremost on local states, with the United States and its European allies playing the role of arbiters.”

Hunter continues on a theme of European and U.S. collaboration in his article “EU Should Put Up or Shut Up in Afghanistan.”  He highlights the struggles NATO forces are having in Afghanistan, saying these problems are particularly evident in the “non-military efforts, which is the critical requirement of good governance and development.”  Hunter states that “NATO does not have the skills, resources, or experience to take full charge of meeting Afghanistan’s requirements for external civilian help,” and urges “the EU to take its proper share of responsibility for success in Afghanistan…[and] contribute money, manpower, and officials on the ground…in an equal partnership with NATO.”  Hunter believes that in order to help bring peace and democracy to Afghanistan, the EU--with its emphasis on rebuilding civil society and political infrastructure--needs to play a part in the NATO efforts.  The mission in Afghanistan is the first effort by NATO outside of its North Atlantic/Europe sphere and if it is to succeed, Hunter believes a supporting role by EU is essential.

Grand strategy for the Middle East
By Robert E. Hunter
November 19, 2006

Debate in the United States about the war in Iraq is seemingly about strategy but is really about tactics, as America struggles to control the damage without changing its basic objectives and policies in the Middle East. A strategic reassessment is needed to find a way to deal not just with Iraq, but with the other interrelated problems in the region.
The Bush administration has stopped characterizing its approach in Iraq as “stay the course,” but it is still committed to victory – though the definition of victory has changed over time. Today, the administration characterizes victory as preventing a civil war and preserving a single state, at a time when sectarian fighting amounts to a low-level civil war and threatens to break Iraq into pieces.

Opponents of the administration's approach look for some way to get U.S. forces out of harm's way in Iraq. Some have concocted improbable outcomes – such as a trifurcated state of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds that somehow would produce almost instant comity. Others champion the extreme of military withdrawal that ignores both the risks of terrorism emanating from Iraq and a collapse of American influence throughout the region.
When caught up in such a complex of poor choices, the classic step of statecraft is to change the terms of the debate and broaden it so that one piece, however difficult, no longer dominates everyone's vision.

In the Middle East, that means working to preserve the basic principles of American interests, values and policies. These principles are: a region that is relatively stable; the free flow of oil and gas to U.S. and other foreign markets; a secure Israel; societies that are not hotbeds of terrorism and that are slowly modernizing; and U.S. power that is on call when need be, but not omnipresent or essential on a daily basis.

Achieving these principles is a tall order. But policies and approaches to try getting there are reasonably clear and consist of five big steps.

First is to restate priorities in Iraq as development of a state that can govern itself in relative peace, but whose precise character of government is less important than its ability to secure order, at least for now.

This requirement must begin with understanding what is truly important to the United States: Preventing Iraq from becoming a menace in the region. That includes letting Turkey know that America will oppose an independent Kurdistan and will use military power to thwart activities of the terrorist group PKK (which advocates Kurdish independence) that is operating in Iraq against Turkey.

The requirement also includes telling Saudi Arabia, once and for all, to stop all funding by its nationals for the activities of terrorist groups, whether in Iraq or elsewhere. And, most important, it includes an all-out effort to engage other powers in the region to help recast security and politics in Iraq overall.

This leads to the second big step. The United States needs to see that it can no longer do what it tried to do from the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War onward – to take on both Iraq and Iran simultaneously, demanding that both “behave” according to American interests without considering or promoting interests of their own.

The Clinton administration practiced a basically peaceful policy called Dual Containment. The Bush administration drove that to a logical conclusion, beginning with toppling the government in Baghdad and the continued desire to do the same – through one means or another – in Iran.

The effort to contain Iran has an extra dimension occasioned by the prospect that it may be working to get nuclear weapons. If Iran is pursuing weapons, the action is at least in part a response to Iranian fears of a possible U.S. military attack patterned after the invasion of Iraq.

A generation ago, the United States had reason to believe that the Iranian Revolution would infect other Muslim societies. Despite the strident rhetoric of Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that time has passed and the mullahs' broader appeal is a husk of its former self.

Strategically, an Iran that would be willing to accept intrusive inspections of its nuclear facilities and give up its support for terrorist groups such as Hezbollah would be an Iran that poses little threat to the U.S. position in the region. But even to attempt to get there would require America to consider a grand bargain: an exchange of Iranian “good behavior” for U.S. security guarantees and Iran's re-entry into the international community.

Such a grand bargain would require direct U.S. talks with Iran. Washington still refuses even to consider such a deal, however, or to allow Iran's European interlocutors to put it on the table.

The third big step is for the United States to recognize that seeking to reach a peace agreement between Israel and an independent Palestinian state has become a strategic imperative. Like it or not, America's standing among all of the Muslim world and its European allies demands that it renew its role as peacemaker – vigorously, without letup – and without being deflected from the goal.

The outlines of peace have been clear for several years and center on land swaps that would let Israel keep territory embracing about half of the West Bank Jewish settlers; a united Jerusalem as capital of two states; monetary compensation of 1948 Palestinian refugees; and a disarmed Palestinian state with the presence of a NATO-led peace force. The most important factor lacking in gaining such a peace is not new ideas but political leadership on all sides: Israel, the Palestinians and the United States.

Fourth is Afghanistan, where the Taliban – the original focus of U.S. military force in the greater Middle East since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks – have been making a comeback. Military action by the United States, all NATO allies and 11 other countries that have formed the International Security Assistance Force has experienced some success, as have the provincial reconstruction teams working with the security force.
What's lacking in Afghanistan is coordination and coherence of non-military efforts, which is the critical requirement of good governance and development. There is also a lack of sufficient resources to do the job over the many years that will be required. The Europeans should be expected to take the lead, including a strong and well-financed role for the European Union, which has so far sat mostly on the sidelines.

Finally, if the United States is not to be consumed by open-ended military engagement in the Middle East, it needs to foster creation of a new regional security system, potentially embracing all regional states that are prepared to choose a course of reciprocal security rather than efforts at national aggrandizement.

How such a security system would operate needs to be considered carefully and no model of another system – such as NATO – is likely to be valid. But the goal should be clear: a system based first and foremost on local states, with the United States and its European allies playing the role of arbiters, when need be, and the security providers of last resort.

These five steps require vision, leadership and statesmanship to be attempted. Even then, they are far from being assured of success. But making the effort is a far better choice than letting debate on Iraq focus on narrow, tactical issues that promise no way out for the United States. That way has already been revealed as a road to failure for long-term U.S. interests in the region and beyond.

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The EU should put up or shut up in Afghanistan
By Robert E. Hunter
Commentary by
Saturday, November 18, 2006

Time is running out for success in Afghanistan. The NATO summit in Riga of Nov. 28-29 may be the last chance to pull that country back from the brink.

NATO assumed responsibility for providing security for all of Afghanistan in October. While about 8,000 of the 20,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan operate independently, the rest have joined the most ambitious military venture in NATO's history, the International Security Assistance Force.

Each of the 26 NATO allies has troops in Afghanistan, as do 11 other countries. Some, like Macedonia and Finland, belong to the Alliance's Partnership for Peace. Others, like Australia and South Korea, come from farther afield. Soldiers from different countries operate almost as a single unit with shared objectives, similar methods, compatible equipment, and complementary skills. A half-century of working together, plus a decade and a half of adapting to new threats and demands, is paying off.

The bad news is that the 40,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan are not enough. A few Afghan provinces, including those along parts of the border with Pakistan and its Taliban sanctuaries, have little or no ISAF presence and no Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Abysmal air and land transport limit the ability to move fighting forces to where they are needed most. Several countries, including NATO allies, have imposed "national caveats" that limit where their troops can be deployed or the tasks they undertake.
So, before any operation, commanders must determine which troops can take part and in what capacity, hampering both efficiency and effectiveness. Nevertheless, NATO would succeed if outside civilian efforts, resources, organization, and leadership in Afghanistan were equal to its own.

Unfortunately, there is no central direction or even coordination of civilian efforts. Although non-governmental organizations are doing an effective job, responsibilities assigned to different European countries - such as helping the Afghan government with law enforcement and poppy eradication - have fallen short of both needs and promises.
Poppy production is soaring, experiments with alternative crops are lagging, and there are not enough forces to provide security for farmers willing to try growing something different. So the Taliban are obtaining ample funds from the heroin trade - easily Afghanistan's largest single source of foreign earnings. Western drug addicts are putting more money into Afghanistan's economy than Western governments.

The shortfalls of the civilian effort and the unwillingness or inability of the Afghan government to provide good governance are the country's central problems. These factors largely explain the Taliban's violent revival, and the uncertainty of many Afghans about whom to support.

NATO has "bet the alliance" on Afghanistan. No amount of "transformation" or "partnerships" or anything else will matter much if NATO fails for the first time in its history - even if that failure is not of its own making.

Firm commitments at Riga of more allied troops and equipment for the ISAF and fewer national "caveats" must be part of the answer. But allied leaders must also act on the knowledge that NATO does not have the skills, resources, or experience to take full charge of meeting Afghanistan's requirements for external civilian help. That task must belong to the European Union, the one institution with the collective means, skills, resources, and - potentially - the leadership to relieve NATO and ISAF of burdens for which they are not suited.

Yet the EU holds back. Turf battles with NATO intrude, as well as competition between the EU's executive Commission and the member-based Council. Even though 19 of NATO's 26 members also belong to the EU, leaders and bureaucrats in most of these countries have been unwilling to back the commitment of their troops with the economic resources needed.
At the Riga summit, NATO should challenge the EU to take its proper share of responsibility for success in Afghanistan. This will require the EU to contribute money, manpower, and officials on the ground of the rank and stature of ISAF commanders, in an equal partnership with NATO.

By coincidence, the EU's rotating presidency is now held by Finland. NATO's presidents and prime ministers could simply cross the Baltic Sea from Riga for a half-day Afghanistan summit with the EU in Helsinki. One or two EU countries might object that this would mix institutional apples and oranges. But for Europeans who claim equal status with NATO for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, this is the time to put up or shut up.
Even if leaders balk at an extra half-day of meetings to address the most serious threat to NATO's future, the Riga summit can issue a demand that its own 19 dual members, and the rest of the EU, agree to assume shared responsibility in Afghanistan.

NATO is in Afghanistan largely owing to shared concerns about terrorism. But NATO is also acting because some European countries want to show Washington that they can pull their security weight even though they refuse to go near the war in Iraq.

All NATO allies and EU members want the United States to remain committed to Europe's future, to take the lead elsewhere in meeting security needs on which all agree, and to admit Europe into its strategic confidence. That now requires supporting the EU's deep involvement in Afghanistan as its key contribution to repairing and reforming the Atlantic Alliance.