

A Diplomat's Handbook for Democratic Development Support

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Chapter 1: Introduction

THE RATIONALE

The Community of Democracies was convened in Warsaw in 2000 to find ways “to work together and strengthen democracy.” As Cambridge scholar John Dunn has observed, while democracy has come to “dominate the world’s imagination”, it has also aroused fear and suspicion .

Democracy is not an end in itself. As a form of governance relying on the consent of the governed, democracy is a means of fulfilling individual lives and pursuing common purposes. As such, democracy expresses human aspirations which are judged to be universal.

By most counts, the number of “free” states has more than doubled in the last few decades, while the number of states considered “not free” has dramatically declined. Observers point, however, to a negative trend beginning to emerge. Democracy has suffered recent reverses.

Also, some authoritarian regimes are banding together in their own form of cooperative resistance to democratic change. Some of them laud the stability of “liberal authoritarianism” over the dangers of “illiberal democracy”. But it is hardly plausible that humans anywhere would prefer governments which ignore the principle of consent of the governed in favor of coercion. Moreover, repressive government in the longer run is counter-productive: as Gandhi observed, “Even the most powerful cannot rule without the cooperation of the ruled”, truer than ever now, when democratic models are much more universally apparent because of the information revolution.

While no single model of democracy has pride of place, the essential positive components of democracy can be defined. Among the most prominent are: elected, accountable government; the transparent rule of law; independent media; protection of human rights and freedom of speech; and equal participation by all in selecting political representation. These democratic values represent achievable ideals which today do depict the political cultures of most of the world’s peoples and the aspirations of many others.

Favorable evolution proceeds; countries offering notable examples of democratic restoration, consolidation, or advance in recent years include Ghana, Mali, Nepal, and Ukraine – and, as Chilean novelist Isabel Allende declared, “Latin America has opted for democracy.”

John Menru of Tanzania was thinking of a new political climate for Africa when he cited these goals to the late Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuscinski, but his aims were universal:

- a. adopt as binding the principle of dialogue;*
- b. ensure society’s participation in public life;*
- c. observe fundamental human rights;*
- d. begin democratization.*

Orderly succession of democratically selected political leadership is also a universal need. In announcing the winner of the Mo Ibrahim Prize for African Leadership in October, Kofi Annan cited particularly Joaquim Chissano’s efforts to build Mozambique democracy on conciliation among ex-opponents.

THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Of course, each democratic culture emerges from civil society in a singular way. But many of the

challenges in achieving and consolidating democracy are shared, especially the always challenging transition from a non-democratic society toward democracy.

John Dunn records the history of democracy's triumphs as a "history of political choice." To succeed, the choice must be a demonstrably effective one. Democracy relies on the realization of certain basic human needs and must aim for their improvement. The test of the democratic process is at the intersection between the participation of citizens in their own governance, and the effectiveness of governance in confronting practical challenges individuals face.

For example, freedom from extreme poverty has been termed the first of the essential freedoms – or, as Amartya Sen put it succinctly, "Freedom and development are inextricable."

It has been charged that democracy can impede the firm conduct of foreign relations or the organization of defense especially at a time of peril, but the record of free peoples on both accounts is eloquent. In recent years, democratic societies have debated the need to constrain some measure of civil liberties in the interests of national security and counter-terrorism. The outcome is often one of dissatisfaction, as this can be a long and winding road.

It is also debated whether specific economic conditions and models favor democracy taking roots in a society. Paddy Ashdown has speculated that "democracy is what people choose when they have enough prosperity that they want a system of government that would protect it". What is clear is that to sustain public confidence, governments must be able to show positive economic achievement with public benefit.

Democratic practice has to be learned. Even once embarked, the democratic journey is an on-going and changing process. Dr. Jennifer Welsh of Oxford University reminds us that elected and accountable government provides the ability of a society to "self-correct" in its pursuit of such policy goals. Or, as Senora Allende observed, "A country, like a husband, is always open to improvement."

THE COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES

While the Community of Democracies has no ambition to be a bloc defined by or formed in antagonism to non-democratic states, member states have made clear they applaud further peaceful progress toward democratic governance in the world. As UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband recently said in Oxford, "We must resist the arguments on both the left and the right to retreat into a world of realpolitik".

There is a "realpolitik" history, especially during the Cold War, of democracies intervening to influence the democratic process elsewhere, or of subverting democratically elected governments for perceived reasons of international competition. More recently, there have been efforts to force democracy on others. Ill-prepared attempts to democratize unstable states without the support of the people can lead to ethnic or sectarian conflict. This *Handbook* favors outside arms' length support for the long-term development of civil rights and civil society, with the emphasis on responsive support for citizens, democracy activists, or human rights defenders already engaged in the effort.

There is, of course, something of a paradox involved. On the one hand, there is a long international history of democrats aiding each other, from the inter-mingling of the American and French revolutions, to the waves of change which swept over Europe in 1848, or in 1989. On the other hand, democracy is about people developing popular self-government for themselves.

Diplomats from democracies need to carry on the tradition of supporting democrats and sharing practical

know-how, while being respectful that ultimately democracy is a form of self-rule requiring that things be done by a domestic civil society itself.

It is in this spirit that Community members greatly value being able to respond to the need for support from reform-minded groups and individuals as they struggle to introduce and improve democratic governance and human rights in their own societies, and to working with governments and non-governmental groups everywhere to improve democratic governance. As the *Handbook* will set out, the rights to help and be helped are consistent with the aims and obligations of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.

THE ROLE OF DIPLOMATS AND THE HANDBOOK

In seeking such help, civil society groups have often turned to Embassies or Consulates of Community of Democracies member states for advice and assistance. There is no codified set of procedures for diplomats to follow in order to respond effectively. Each situation is different, presenting unstructured problems and opportunities which diplomats need to interpret according to local as well as general merits, including the bilateral relationship itself. However, there has been considerable past experience which might be helpful on a case-by-case basis in the field.

This *Diplomat's Handbook for Democracy Development Support* is accompanied by a variety of case studies documenting and explaining specific country experiences. It also identifies creative, human, and material resources available to Missions, the ways in which Missions and diplomats have supported requests in the past, and describes how such support has been applied.

We hope to collect a growing number of examples of “older” democracies adapting democratic techniques from “younger” ones; the democratic learning experience is not all one-way. For example, innovative Brazilian methods for citizens to participate in budget-setting exercises in local government have been adapted for use in the United Kingdom.

A review of all these experiences bears out the validity of our belief in our inter-dependence. It will hopefully also provide practitioners with encouragement, counsel, and a greater capacity to support democrats everywhere.

Chapter 2: The International Context

SOLIDARITY

While each country experiences in its own way the passage toward the democratic form its citizens choose as most suitable for their own society, there is one point in common to all such passages: democracy cannot be imported from outside, much less imposed. Reform movements can only emerge from within societies. External support and mentoring of skills can help them succeed, but outside allies and helpers should always follow the lead of domestic reformers and agents of change.

International conventions and organizations promote the acceptance of human rights but ultimately these are subject mostly to circumstances within states. Moral philosopher Tzvetan Todorov pointed out in his Oxford Amnesty Lecture that the inhabitants of most countries derive their rights much more as citizens of states than as citizens of the world. The Community of Democracies counts as an important objective the strengthening of the capacity of states to assure the rights of its citizens.

Still, the “venerable practice of international solidarity” has been an important contributing force in the encouragement of democrats and the widening of democratic opportunities for citizens everywhere. In 1989, Vaclav Havel wrote to the International PEN Congress in Montreal which he was not permitted by Czechoslovak authorities to attend in person:

“In today’s world, more and more people are aware of the indivisibility of human fate on this planet, that the problems of anyone of us, or whatever country we come from – be it the smallest and most forgotten – are the problems of us all; that our freedom is indivisible as well, and that we all believe in the same basic values, while sharing common fears about the threats that are hanging over humanity today.”

A GLOBAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

Almost 20 years later, the revolution in information technologies and techniques has deepened the truth that all democrats are potential partners. The international reality, at least for those with the necessary means, is virtually free access to information from outside. The globalization of information encourages connections, awareness of norms elsewhere and the comparing of notes on best policies and practices.

Western radio and TV broadcasts hastened change in Eastern Europe; fax machines connected Chinese students to the outside world in 1989; text messaging a few years later mobilized popular demonstrations in South-east Asia; the Internet was pivotal in rallying widespread participation in civil resistance in Serbia and Ukraine, while Internet bloggers briefly enabled the world to witness the harshly violent repression in Burma of peaceful demonstrations.

In some constrained societies, even though moves to limit connectivity run counter to national interest in enhancing competitiveness, targeted efforts to restrict Internet access and close off sites persist, or flare up during periods of agitation or protest. In more technology-fluent societies such as China, such walls are frequently circumvented with the assistance of supporters outside by the persistence and ingenuity of the more than two hundred million citizens who use the Internet, though many foreign news outlet sites are blocked.

A NEW PARADIGM FOR DIPLOMACY

Whereas once the conduct of diplomatic relations was strictly on a state-to-state basis, in recent years diplomacy as practiced by many democratic nations has taken on more of a human face. For most democracies, the days are long past when their Embassies were concerned only with maintaining “good relations” with the host government, irrespective of its character, as a former diplomat recalled of his mandate in Burma in the 1980’s, when human rights were not high in the hierarchy of Embassy priorities.

Today, Ambassadors and diplomats are much more likely to engage the people of the host countries and not only government officials, and to make consistent messaging on human rights and governance a central part of their country mission. In contemporary diplomacy, Embassies and Consulates have become vehicles of public diplomacy and outreach, and brokers promoting contact and communications between the peoples and non-governmental organizations and groups of sending and host countries. Democracy development and human rights are among the most active topics of such communication.

In addition to encouraging and facilitating some of these connections, Embassies are called upon to promote and defend the rights of people to so communicate. They also intervene when necessary to defend and support threatened human rights defenders and democratic activists, either demonstrably in public view, or, as the case merits, privately, below the radar. The *Handbook* will illustrate the many ways this has happened in the past, including occasions when authoritarian governments attempted to intimidate or expel diplomats for such legal activity. In such circumstances, of course, it is essential that diplomatic initiative in support of human rights defenders and democratic activists be welcomed and even rewarded by the career culture of foreign ministries, which is becoming more the trend for many.

REVOLUTION, REFORM, AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT – CASE STUDIES

There is in practice a “right to be helped” as well as a “right to help”. The role of outsiders is never primary, but their support can be catalytic.

Each country and situation is different. But there are common patterns in how international solidarity benefits extended struggles for human rights and self-determination, as the *Handbook* notably describes in the case studies of successful transitions to democracy in South Africa and Chile.

There, and in other countries where democratic activists had worked to end authoritarian conditions, transitions to democracy were greatly aided by opportunities over the years for democrats to develop their competence in law, economics, and other key areas of governance via access to programs administered internationally. International solidarity’s support for civil society over time can also contribute to the resolution of short-term crises, such as protecting the integrity of early electoral processes in Ukraine.

Internal, domestic actions which were decisive in these and other struggles for democracy – the demonstrations, boycotts, and other forms of non-violent civil resistance – drew from a supportive external framework of psychological, political, and practical measures which circumscribed the options of non-democratic governments.

Inside activists and reformers often seek inspiration from models other societies provide, and take counsel from the comparable prior experiences of other reformers, most of which are relatively recent. After all, the consolidation of effective democratic systems is mostly a phenomenon of the latter half of the 20th century, spurred by the aftermath of World War II, decolonization, and most recently, the end of Cold War competition.

The Gandhian example of non-violent conflict has served as a template for hundreds of millions of

aspiring democrats. More recently, the experience of the Solidarnosc movement in Poland had immense influence beyond its region. Institutional example can be passed on, such as the Chilean effort to construct a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, whose model proved useful a few years later in South Africa. Their lessons are studied in turn in other post-authoritarian locales, such as Afghanistan, where a truth-seeking and reconciliation effort with the financial support of democratic allies is underway.

Positions taken internationally by outside democratic governments can be crucial. Authoritarian regimes do try to claim legitimacy pointing to support from countries reliant on them for security or other interests. It is important that democracies offset these claims via coordinated international action such as the targeted sanctions and arms embargos on the South African apartheid regime. These made its finances unsustainable, especially in regard to the expenses of equipping for war with front-line states. Sanctions can always be controversial because they can hurt the innocent in an oppressed society unless carefully targeted. In this case, the crucial factor was that external sanctions were demanded by South African anti-apartheid movements, the ANC and UDF.

As noted above, there have been many occasions when democratic governments and their representatives have protested the violation of human rights, as in Burma today, and have conditioned state-to-state cooperation (except humanitarian aid) on the modification of behavior. But it is vital for democratic governments to do more than episode-by-episode protest and maintain sustained programs of democratic development support, including ongoing dialogues with the host countries. Even many authoritarian regimes feel obliged to feign some reformist intentions. These can provide activists, reformers and diplomats with potentially valuable openings and opportunities.

In Chile, external support to civil society began with humanitarian action offering asylum to thousands of refugees after the coup d'état of September 11, 1973. For the next 15 years, the resulting diaspora of Chilean exiles kept the repressive political condition of Chile high in the consciousness of democrats everywhere.

In consequence, trade union movements in Europe and North America, political parties, such as European social and Christian democrats, and individual political leaders such as German Chancellor Kohl or Senator Edward Kennedy provided Chilean citizens with confidence that they were not alone in the struggle which began to build up against the Pinochet dictatorship's repression.

In such struggles as Chile or South Africa, broad-based coalitions of activists and reformers were able to come together as allies in seeking a democratic outcome for their country with the encouragement and assistance of links forged with civil society outside. Local groups formed around the issues of women's and youth rights, ecological protection, a free press, culture, and professions such as law or architecture, have had the support of the extensive international networks of foundations, agencies, and organizations in democratic countries with a mandate to promote contact and democracy development across borders.

There have been many efforts by authoritarian regimes to ban outside financial and other assistance from foreign governments. Outside advocacy groups and organizations benefit from some government financing under growing democracy support programs, but their independent operation in the field should necessarily be at arms' length to government, which in any case often enhances their effectiveness.

It is not surprising that the sense of values at the core of the growing tendency to enhance the role of democracy support in foreign policy has helped enlist church groups in promoting human rights. Particularly noteworthy was the expulsion of the South African Dutch Reformed Church from the World Alliance of Reformed Churches which deepened the sense of isolation felt by those parts of the public on whose support the apartheid regime relied. The Roman Catholic Church played a central ethical and practical role in comforting opponents of the dictatorship in Chile and the Philippines. International

church groups are at the forefront of supporting Buddhist monks' opposition to dictatorial rule in Burma today.

ELECTIONS

Although there is much more to democracy than free and fair elections, the right of people to freely choose their representatives in government is a basic requirement of democracy.

International agencies help and advise in the technical organization and management of elections. Several development assistance programs support projects designed to assist and engage greater public understanding.

Such regional or inter-regional organizations as the European Union, the OSCE, the OAS, or the Commonwealth of Nations, prescribe democratic practice as a pre-condition of membership, and monitor and verify elections as free and fair or not (although some OSCE members pay only lip service to democratic practice and even contest the organization's prerogatives to verify their elections, some of which have not been judged free and fair).

When elections are at risk of being manipulated, a full range of international contacts and experience in mobilizing civil society can come into play. Ongoing NGO contacts had a key role in electoral crisis management such as occurred in Ukraine in 2004, or earlier in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, and Georgia, and later in Kyrgystan.

The success in redeeming the election's integrity in Ukraine was due to the democratic and reform movements' mass protests and pressures, but sustained international support over time from governments, Embassies, and people-to-people NGO's was also important, as the *Handbook* case-study on Ukraine will demonstrate.

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

To repeat, holding elections represents only the starting point for democracy. In some cases, election winners once in power are tempted to limit democracy or slide toward outright autocracy. "One person, one vote, one time" was a slogan skeptical of democracy in South Africa, but sadly has described a tendency elsewhere which has had deeply corrosive effect on public morale. As opposition leader in Zimbabwe Morgan Tsvangirai, has pointed out, a political culture of abuse and corruption can outlive any specific authoritarian leader.

This underlines the need to sustain a dual time-frame to democracy development: the short-term challenges and opportunities of free elections, and the longer haul of democratic consolidation which requires democratic support to continue long after the first elections are held.

Most fledgling democracies do not need to confront armed resistance to democracy. But in 1996, Sierra Leone managed fair and successful elections despite the efforts by a rebel rejectionist army to block them. However, the development assistance needed to consolidate the fragile democracy was not forthcoming even though resident Ambassadors of potential donor democracies tried to persuade their capitals of its importance and urgency. The brave democratic experiment under President Kabbah fell within a few short years to the armed rebels bent on seizing power. (Democracy has since been restored, as illustrated in the case-study attached.)

The establishment of the International Centre for Democratic Transition in Budapest, endorsed by the Community of Democracies at its Biennial Conference in Santiago in 2005, was designed to aggregate 20 years of efforts by the international community to support democratic societies by offering to aspiring democracy activists the experiences of successful transitions, and to help those in transition consolidate their gains. Over those 20 years, errors of foresight and misplaced emphasis abound, but lessons have been learned.

What is clear, as Fareed Zakaria has warned, the “long, hard, slog” of democratic consolidation means that donor and partner democracies must accept “constant engagement, aid, multilateral efforts and a world not of black and white, but of grey.” The citizens of the new democracies are the ones who will bring clarity and definition to their society. As Salvador Allende predicted for Chile, it is the people who make history. Successful democratic transition has been realized on every continent. No people anywhere should be judged as incapable or ineligible for ultimately settling their own destiny. External support can play a secondary role in helping to provide them with the greater capacity and means their development process requires, but its design aims at enabling them to choose their own government representatives and policy goals.

WORKING TOGETHER

The effectiveness of democratic development support is enhanced when democratic partners work together.

Such concerted action – representation on human rights, or activity in support of democratic development – is what the Community of Democracies members’ diplomatic Missions can aspire to achieve on the ground. The succeeding Chapter on Toolbox applications is meant to spell out the ways such efforts, coordinated and individual, have succeeded, or not, in the past.

Chapter 3: The Diplomat's Toolbox

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 3 sets out the sorts of opportunities and constraints diplomats encounter in democracy development support from 3 perspectives: 1) the resources and assets at a diplomat's disposal; 2) the ways in which diplomats have deployed these assets in support of civil society and democratic development in a multitude of situations over the last decades; and 3) their applications in favor of local partners, policy goals, and programs.

The *Handbook* assumes that foreign ministries accept a need to adapt diplomatic representation to the new paradigms of public diplomacy. But there are three noteworthy caveats:

a) At any time, a country usually has a range of public and discrete interests reflected in a bilateral relationship which diplomats in the field need to manage simultaneously. Incontestably, there are many examples of human rights and democracy support being soft-pedaled so as not to undermine security or economic goals at stake. But the spread of democracy assists international security and legal protection for investment and trade. There is no conflict between "interests" and "values", as the pursuit of democratic values is in the national and international interest. The historic record shows that democratically-elected governments inter-relate in ways which enhance and contribute to general peace, security, and prosperity, and to the overall interests of democratic partners. Democracies should be able to represent all of their interests simultaneously and effectively, especially if there is a context of solidarity with other democracies.

b) Diplomats have to work consistently with their countries' interests and aims. But they are also on their own initiative. Canadian diplomat Pierre Guimond described democracy support activity in Prague in the 1980's, "Diplomats have to know where the governments want to go in terms of foreign policy and then the ambassador is responsible for delivering the policy. But it's impossible for people in the capital city to decide 'you should go to all the demonstrations, and you should do this and you should do that'. The foreign ministry knows what we do because we send regular reports. It is result-based, not event-based. It's not because we've been to 36 demonstrations that anything will happen. We were there because something is happening." What "is happening" becomes the outcome, and its fate is in the hands of local reformers and activists but with the legitimate encouragement of democratic Embassies.

c) It is also important to acknowledge that often, the impact of constructive outreach activity or demarches in support of democratic development is not readily apparent. It takes consistent and sustained effort to contribute to building the self-confidence of civil society and to restraining repressive behavior on the part of non-democratic authorities. But in authoritarian societies, the gains of democracy can also come swiftly. "Living in any authoritarian country, while you're in the midst of it, it's hard to see that they'll ever cede power or go away. But actually, they cause their own destruction. And their foundations are rotting. It's a question of time." (Shari Villarosa, US Charge d' Affaires, Burma)

1. TOOLBOX RESOURCES AND ASSETS

IMMUNITY: the unique asset of diplomatic immunity can be employed and virtually shared in ways which benefit individuals and groups pursuing democratic development goals and reform.

Nota bene: Host countries can't withdraw immunity, but several have expelled diplomats for

alleged interference in internal affairs. The excuse is often that they had supported specific political or partisan outcomes rather than democracy development in general. Intimidation is a frequent recourse of authoritarian regimes, including against the families of diplomats.

Examples: There is an extensive record of democratic governments' diplomats preventing punitive state violence by their mere presence at the scene.

In Kiev, in 2004, representatives of the French Embassy and the European Commission arrived at the home of a youth leader just as police were about to arrest democratic activists present. The police retreated. In Nepal, in 2005, threatened dissidents had been granted visas by resident Embassies; diplomats of asylum countries accompanied them to the airport and to departure gates to block their seizure by authorities.

There is also a record of harsh state reaction to intervention on the ground by diplomats against repressive action, often against the most publicly visible intervenors. In 1973, in Chile, diplomats from several democracies made their ways to the stadium and other locales where the military putschists had assembled arrested activists, many of whom were subsequently imprisoned or killed. The regime expelled the most prominent of the diplomats, Swedish Ambassador Edelstam. Expulsions of foreign representatives have since occurred under many repressive regimes, most recently in Sudan and Burma, but the number of times diplomats have deployed physical presence to discourage arbitrary repression of legitimate activity has increased, to considerable effect.

There is a similarly long history of repressive governments warning individual diplomats that their activities threaten to compromise their immunity, and that expulsion could follow. Such warnings are often accompanied by presentation of police photos of diplomats attending demonstrations, or meeting activists, a specialty apartheid South Africa copied from police states in Eastern Europe and the USSR itself. Pressure sometimes extended to intimidation and even violence against family members to underscore the warning that immunities should be seen as a two-way street. But in that diplomats are only acting in support of civil society, the efforts to intimidate and discourage have usually been in vain over the long-term, especially as diplomats point out to local authorities that their own governments will react in kind against any such unwarranted expulsions.

THE SUPPORT OF HOME AUTHORITIES: *such support from their own authorities in sending capitals provides diplomats with effective leverage, the ability to link benefits to behavior, and in extremis, the opportunity to recommend the imposition of sanctions.*

Nota bene: Diplomatic relations are reciprocal. As benefits are a two-way street, their leverage can work as much in favor of greater freedom of action for diplomats in support of civil society as it can as a weapon against them by local authorities. Diplomats can urge their own capitals to facilitate or discourage access for visiting host country officials seeking potentially advantageous business or other partners, and home-state cooperation programs and connections. Diplomats also promote crucial support from home authorities when their own nationals come under attack abroad.

Negative leverage in the form of sanctions is a powerful tool, but it may be true that the possibility of sanctions can sometimes be a greater influence on behavior than the finality of sanctions themselves.

Many episodes requiring the support and even intervention of diplomats develop rapidly. It is

essential that officers in the field be able to respond to the requirements without worry that their actions will be second-guessed at headquarters, and their careers affected negatively. This is a powerful argument for training foreign service officers in democracy support beforehand and for clear and explicit support for human rights and democracy defense as core priorities of the country programs.

Examples: The leaders of authoritarian states generally still want the status and positive exposure of international travel, not to mention business partnerships sought by industry and economic interests at home. This enables democratic Embassies to condition their support for such media, political, and business contacts on moderation of anti-democratic behavior.

In cases when authorities try to intimidate diplomatic representatives, the support of home authorities is crucial. Canadian diplomats reacted to South African Foreign Ministry warnings of expulsion in the 1980's by pointing out that the South African Embassy in Ottawa would suffer swift retaliation with a corresponding negative impact on South African economic and other interests.

It is now apparent that in 2004, the warning by senior US diplomats that the United States Government would freeze personal off-shore assets of Ukrainian officials in the event of government repression had considerable restraining impact on behavior. Such selective targeting of responsible top officials' personal off-shore financial and other transactions is increasingly used against anti-democratic regimes, as exist in Zimbabwe and Burma.

Sanctions are a powerful weapon to moderate repressive behavior. Even when regimes feign indifference as Pinochet did when the US cut off all but humanitarian aid to Chile in 1976, the international opprobrium of sanctions stings, as does the economic impact. Diplomats on the ground advise home authorities on timing, targeting, and potential impact overall –as were the EU's targeted sanctions of travel bans and asset freezes on 31 individuals in Belarus, and 126 in Zimbabwe, developed in consultation with EU missions. However, the threatened use of sanctions in the absence of behavior modification can sometimes be as influential if not more so than the finality of sanctions themselves

Diplomats may also find they need to discourage home authorities from reaping tempting domestic political dividends from sanctioning an unpopular regime in ways which may then adversely affect the most vulnerable in civil society, or which constrict exposure to international visitors and otherwise impede beneficial contact with the outside. International solidarity is very pertinent particularly since the impact of sanctions can be neutralized when there are off-setting flows of material support from non-democracies or opponents of sanctions, as in Zimbabwe, Burma, or Belarus today.

When nationals who are human rights activists are threatened or arrested, the declaration of support for their positions can be crucial. As James Mawdsley, who was imprisoned in Burma for human rights work, put it, there are “ways in which consular duties were more than consular”. He commented “If the FCO had not said the same thing on the outside, I would have been beaten up. But the regime was too afraid to beat me up over issues where the FCO gave me backing”.

***INFLUENCE;** in the new paradigm of public diplomacy, diplomats are more conscious of representing their society to the host society. The reputation of the society they project locally, its experience, values, and capacities to help, are deployable assets. The experience gained by democracies which have only recently emerged from repressive conditions has special value. The effect of public diplomacy is obviously reinforced where there is local popular respect for the sending country's institutions,*

achievements and governance and for the way people live, which also adds credibility to the force of example in dialogue with local authorities on democratic development.

Examples: Countries in transition benefit from the examples of those with which they wish to strike closer relationships. The most applicable examples can often be those of countries with recent comparable experience in democratization. As a Czech Ambassador expressed his country's interest in democracy support, "We were grateful for the help we received from the West in the 1980's. So it should be a priority in our foreign policy to help".

Outside inducements to undertaking a rigorous program of democratization and institution-building also emerge from conditionalities which are increasingly prominent features of multilateral and bilateral relationships on every continent.

African peer pressure, the efforts of the African Union, and the best practices approach of The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), as well as positive governance conditions from international economic institutions, have had positive effect in several African countries. Their work has been reinforced by the obligations of membership in the Commonwealth of Nations and l'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie both of which place the encouragement of democracy and human rights at the core of their activity and purpose. The ability of democratic forces to prevail in such African countries as Ghana, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, and Mali are examples of these shared efforts.

The European Union's requirement that applicants for membership fulfill the "acquis" of democratic and effective governance has had a profound influence on building what is an enlarging arc of stability and democracy across Europe. The OSCE and NATO are also dedicated to monitoring the democratic governance of member states.

The Organization of American States reinforces the strength of democratic development in Latin America. ASEAN is making governance increasingly part of its mandate, as can be seen by its criticism of the regime in Burma. Australia's enhanced regional cooperation programs via the Pacific Islands Forum place governance development assistance at the center of their mandate; both Australia and New Zealand have been strong players in efforts to encourage democratic outcomes in East Timor, the Solomons, and Fiji.

The central point here is that such various influences from the outside can only take hold when civil society inside the affected countries perceive that their effort to emulate in a nationally-suitable way the governance and effectiveness of democratic societies can be realized because of easier access to outside support. This outward aspiration provides diplomats geared to the merits of public diplomacy multiple opportunities. By identifying more with the assets and features of their own society which are most admired – for example, the way US diplomats can bond with Lebanese esteem for the high quality of American post-secondary education – diplomats can help to compensate for any perception of policy differences between governments. The US Fulbright program and the EU's Erasmus Mundi constitute people-to-people tools, which have many counterparts elsewhere, and which greatly improve the context within which diplomatic representatives operate. But the most powerful tools are often in the hands of diplomats whose countries have themselves had recent experience in winning and consolidating democratic reform.

***FUNDS;** small amounts of post funding can be precious to start-up reform groups and NGO's. While most democracy development financial support is provided through NGO's and institutions, small-grant seed money for grassroots organizations from discretely-administered and easily-disbursed post funds can have swift direct positive effect.*

Examples: In 2002/03, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs established its “Transformation Policy Unit and Fund” to enable Embassies to support democratization, human rights, and transition-related projects in countries with repressive regimes. Most of these projects are deliberately small to enable disbursement directly to local civil society actors without the local government’s scrutiny and involvement.

There are numerous precedents for empowering Embassies in this way. In South Africa, in the 1980’s, the Canadian government created an Embassy-administered fund of unprecedented scale with a mandate for direct assistance to civil society, and especially assistance to victims of apartheid, because of the perception that the diplomatic representatives on the ground were, in liaison with international NGO’s, best placed to identify suitable partners and beneficiaries. The funds helped groups to sustain essential activity and often enabled small but identity-building successes, such as the distribution of t-shirts, or publicity for rallies.

Many Embassies from democratic countries in Russia in the early 1990’s had also found that such small amounts they could disburse rapidly from Post funds directly to soup kitchens, orphanages, women’s groups, etc., were having a clearly helpful humanitarian effect and were earning the Embassies a degree of public credit often not available from the heavily-funded large-scale infrastructure programs which characterized transitional assistance in those years. In Ukraine in 2004, Embassy funding requiring little if any paperwork was critical to the survival of such youth groups as Pora! without much administrative capacity but able at the critical time to stand up for the integrity of Ukraine’s elections and for democracy itself.

***SOLIDARITY** is a valued asset at all phases of democratic development. NGO’s and democratic reformers and activists value the solidarity of mentors with prior experience in democratic reform. Solidarity in democratic assistance programs among like-minded missions and international NGO’s multiplies impact and minimizes duplication. Solidarity also enhances political messaging through witnessing trials, joint demarches on human rights and other issues, and reduces the ability of authoritarian regimes to play the commercial interests of partners off against each other.*

Examples: In the transitional countries of Europe building up to and following the great changes of 1989, mentoring by successive reformers contributed to the self-confidence and effectiveness of catalytic groups in civil society – Solidarnosc mentored Czechoslovakian and Hungarian reformers in the late 1980’s; Slovakian reformers helped Croatians, Serbs, and Ukrainians in 2000-2004; the Serbian youth movement Otpor aided Pora in Ukraine in 2004. Many of these efforts were facilitated or channeled by diplomats from the countries which had undergone the earlier reforms, a pattern which has been apparent in Latin America and which now characterizes the foreign policies of many newer democracies in their relationships throughout the world.

Solidarity among western democracies and with international NGO’s has been instrumental in avoiding duplication or errors of omission in democratic support programs. In Serbia in 2000, democracies and NGO’s cooperated via a “donors’ forum” which greatly increased the effectiveness and coverage of such assistance, a technique now in good use among democratic country Embassies and NGO’s in many locales.

The most effective form of solidarity among donors is that which avoids competition and which benefits from comparative advantage: as stated by a Czech Ambassador, “We learned how to plug-in from the Dutch, the Norwegians and the US. We tried to find where we would have the most value-added, and learned quickly that our democratic transition experience was that. So we concentrated on transfer of know-how. Not everything is transferable, of course. But we still had a lot to offer. If they

want, they can even learn from our mistakes”.

Solidarity in diplomatic representations by joint demarches can also multiply effectiveness, especially if the concerned presenters are close allies of the authorities, as was the case in 2005 when the U.S., the UK, and Canada made a joint demarche to Afghan authorities against curbs on freedom of speech.

Beginning with the trial of Nelson Mandela in 1963, a strong pattern of solidarity among diplomatic representatives has emerged in support of human rights defenders and democratic activists on trial for their activities. This conveys to the authorities that the conduct of such proceedings is indeed being monitored by democratic partners, and not only by the country which may be more specifically concerned if there is an issue of dual nationality or some other national tie to defendants. Prominent later examples would include the trials of Vaclav Havel and other human rights activists in Prague in the 1980's. Solidarity can also extend to the monitoring of prosecution when perpetrators of violence against human rights defenders and others are on trial because of international or other pressures: for example, methodical attendance by resident EU diplomats at the trial of security personnel who had beaten to death Canadian-Iranian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi-Ahmadabadi in Tehran.

LEGITIMACY; Many democratic activists would agree with Francis Fukuyama that “in today’s world, the only serious form of legitimacy is democracy”. Diplomats can draw for support from a variety of basic international agreements. Examples include the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. These set out the international norms which diplomats of democratic countries can legitimately claim to represent. Repressive jurisdictions may well maintain these texts are not internationally binding and that such activities amount to interference in internal sovereign matters by foreign representatives. But international norms on human rights are increasingly conditioning behavior and limiting the number of countries which insist on the primacy of national sovereignty, in part because of monitoring by specially mandated regional and other transnational authorities in monitoring performance.

Examples: The UN Secretary-General’s Special Representatives on Human Rights, and on Torture, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders in Africa, the African Union itself, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the OAS, the OSCE, the Commonwealth of Nations, and “La Francophonie” are examples of certifying bodies diplomatic representatives can point to for validation of the legitimacy of their own efforts at democracy development support.

Regional agreements have shown themselves to be particularly effective in conditioning the behavior of an increasing number of countries, although there are regimes which remain hermetically sealed from outside opinion, such as Burma or North Korea. The most prominent example of an effective regional agreement is the provisions of the Helsinki accords of the CSCE, which in the 1980's provided the benchmark textual references for Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, and for the Sakharov-Bonner campaign in the USSR, and for freeing up information and expression generally. These agreements were effective because they had been signed by the states in question.

2. 15 WAYS DIPLOMATS HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE

The tools described below are potentially powerful, especially when deployed using the pro-active and public outreach approach which is the hallmark of modern democratic diplomacy.

Arranged in escalating sequence from more conventional diplomatic activities to more interventionist

action, taken together these tools represent a potential for diplomats to develop and refine specific professional skill sets in democracy development support, which, of course, are integrally related to their work in support of economic and social development, as well as human security.

The Golden Rules

- 1) *LISTENING, RESPECTING, AND UNDERSTANDING*; all diplomats make it their task to try to grasp the culture, psychology, and situation of their country of accreditation. Additionally, it is a sign of support for civil society when diplomats seek contact with local NGO's and groups on taking up responsibilities, especially when Heads of Mission make introductory calls. The first step is to ask for advice from local civil society how best to support their efforts. Respecting and understanding the different roles and interests of all partners in the democratic development process is a basic requirement for productive relationships and successful support. Outsiders also have to understand and respect the ways in which the local reform process needs to take account of traditional values: social and political practices common in one country can be abrasive in another.

Nota bene: overall, the first maxim of “respecting” is to listen (ideally in the language of the country). This includes the need for diplomats to recognize the risks and sacrifices incurred by democratic activists, as well as the challenges they face in running for political office in authoritarian settings. Usually, dissidents believe that contact with diplomats is protective and helpful, but their judgment should prevail. Sometimes particular Embassies/governments are more “radioactive” than others, leaving room only for the less controversial to sustain contact and protection. In some circumstances, the initiatives of civil society are best pursued without any evidence of outside support from government representatives, and diplomats find it useful to defer to the different and often primary roles played by international NGO's in local activity

Such as: the demonstrable value to civil society groups when newly arrived US Ambassador Harry Barnes made introductory calls to them at the same time as calling on officials of the Pinochet regime in Chile. When the UK was in the Presidency of the EU in 2005, UK diplomats and officials consulted Russian NGO's prior to EU-Russia dialogue meetings, and took pains to debrief them afterward.

But it should always be recognized that democratic activists need space, and often discretion. A Czech Ambassador confides that countries which have themselves “experienced life under a repressive regime are often best placed to understand the situation of dissidents having to face their families and friends’ vulnerability to reprisal – loss of job, imprisonment, worse – for their anti-regime activity”. In Iran today, there is a campaign by women’s groups to obtain a million signatures from Iranian women on a petition to change the status of women under property law; this effort would be undermined if opponents could show evidence of support from outside. On occasion, democratic activists, human rights defenders, and reformers in Iran, Cuba, or elsewhere have sent the message that temporarily they needed to pursue their work without outside support.

International NGO's are frequently closer to the ground than diplomats and better able to pursue productive working partnerships with civil society. Diplomats need to know when to seek partnerships with them and when to recognize that the integrity of NGO work also needs distance from government connections, even when project funding is provided by government programs in capitals. In many traditional societies, local values can collide with the practices of outsiders, a condition which has made it imperative in such locales as Afghanistan to respect the strength of tradition in supporting democratic transition on such essential but challenging issues as gender

equality. Yet, some diplomats such as US Ambassador Barbara Bodine in Yemen have been able to support expanded women's rights without creating local traditionalist backlash by respecting the need of local groups to build their bridges to others.

2) *SHARING*; solidarity among democracies multiplies effectiveness. Like-minded Embassies, Community of Democracies members, and engaged international NGO's need to share information and practice project coordination and team play in order to optimize beneficial impacts. These efforts are most effective when local partners are also part of the sharing process and able to assume responsible local "buy-in". Diplomats in the field can become "cohering agents" of support programs combining democracy and development.

Nota bene: It is generally easier to organize informal cooperation in the field than among capitals, especially among representatives of like-minded countries seeking to organize informal international policy groupings which also include international NGO's which are often able to provide a wider and more authentic picture of grass-roots and technical activity to promote democracy development.

Such as: Missions regularly compare analyses of country situations, specifically regarding human rights in countries such as China, where the situation is complicated and evolving, making assessments difficult. In repressive situations such as in Burma, some democratic Embassies work closely together to exchange information and coordinate strategies, and then regularly meet with a broader group of democratic Embassies from the region.

The central point is that there should not be a competition among like-minded democratic Missions, resident and non-resident. The best outcomes are when Missions defer to work already on-going, or to specifically advantageous roles of others. In Burma, some European democratic representatives plugged into other countries' programs which were already running, such as the Netherlands' "foreign policy training" seminars in the region for young refugees from all Burmese ethnic groups. Some Missions enjoy or have connections to cultural facilities which can be shared by other Embassies, or used by non-resident diplomats, as the French cultural organization, the Alliance Francaise, has done in Burma.

In rapidly-developing crises, democratic Embassies and international NGO's have created coordinating and clearing-house groups for fast-disbursal of aid to local civil society and the electoral process, such as the "Donors Group" in Belgrade in 2000.

In situations of more enduring difficulty for democratic activists and civil society, diplomatic representatives share duties to monitor and verify functions such as court dates and trials of democracy activists or scholars, or cover such events in force, thereby highlighting the international political stakes for repressive regimes. The practice has been extensive, from South Africa in the 1960's to Burma and Iran today. Joint demarches are also de rigeur on human rights and democratic transparency.

Sharing information on development issues, including on governance support activity, is becoming recognized as essential to avoid duplication or omissions. The practice is now more frequent on the local level and includes international NGO's and multilateral agencies in the field. It is most productive when democratic host governments are themselves dynamic partners in the process (though not when more authoritarian regimes insist on control of all development funding, as in Nepal when NGO funds had to be channeled through the Queen).

In Bangladesh there is a "Local Consultative Group" which brings together 32 Bangladesh-based

representatives of donor Missions and multilateral agencies with key local officials. There are also supplementary groupings such as the “Like-minded Donor Group” comprising local representatives of Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. These groups work in turn with groups of NGO’s, such as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), or the Association for Development Agencies (ADAB), which have track records of enhancing the democratic input by civil society into the development process. The process can go beyond co-ordination: In Ghana, with the support of a government and civil society seeking governance development assistance, like-minded donor countries (Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK) have created a collaborative \$8 million program (the Ghana Research and Advocacy Program).

There has been, of course, a myriad of experience of inadequate donor coordination particularly in circumstances of post-conflict reconstruction where the aid flows are very substantial and usually urgent. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international tendency was initially toward an excess of humanitarian assistance, not always strategically coordinated, but insufficient development assistance, as well as inadequate coordination of planning and operations for development and security. Later, in Afghanistan, the aid effort began in 2001 with an unprecedented degree of donor coordination that enabled an overall development strategy. But in recent years, it has fallen much more to Mission diplomats, aid officials, and the military to ensure coordination and effectiveness on the ground, and “coordinating groups” have proliferated.

Truth in Communications

- 3) *REPORTING*; confidential assessment is at the core of diplomatic responsibility. In reporting on the likelihood of a democratic process emerging or being successfully sustained, Missions have to assess the local situation, capacity, and psychological, political, or even cultural constraints. Making analysis of the situation and prospects for human rights and governance in a host country part of a regular reporting process to capitals (and to public outlets as the case may be) encourages rigor in analysis. It also helps the development of a template approach to benchmarks and norms to assist in comparisons and common evaluations by NGO’s and centers of excellence.

Nota bene: Reporting must be demonstrably comprehensive and also balanced in its sourcing. Diplomatic professionals always heed the question as to whether their confidential and value-added reporting of circumstances and conditions in the host country draws from a wide range of contacts in the society (such as the “township attaches” at the British Embassy in South Africa, early 1990’s), and avoids excessive deference to official sources or to over-arching security or other bilateral interests.

Such as: the reporting from missions draws out the diversities and particularities of country situations, each of which is different, to guide supportive activity. As examples of contrast, diplomats in Afghanistan emphasize the importance of local and district officials which have traditionally decisive roles, whereas diplomats in Iraq emphasize the decisive role of the central government in Baghdad

There are multiple examples of regular human rights reporting, since this is a core vocation of diplomatic representation. In high-profile and relatively open crisis situations, Mission reporting is supplementary to that of international media but often plays a crucial role in providing context or important background. But in situations such as Burma today where international media have been basically expelled, the responsibility of Missions to report the conditions and prospects for change is enhanced, though rendered more difficult by a regime very suspicious of contacts between citizens and foreign representatives.

Many less fortunate examples in reporting exist. A failure to do people-level reporting has led to persistent and damaging mis-readings and assumptions of continuity in power, inability to prevent tragedy or to encourage positive change. In some countries a repressive strategic ally has frowned on diplomatic representatives contacting the opposition, or providing adversary political analysis, such as in Iran prior to 1979. Then, some situations are potentially so extraordinary there is a tendency of empathetic diplomatic representatives to “look away from the dark signs”, as occurred in the build-up to unimaginable atrocity in Rwanda in 1994.

- 4) *INFORMING*; in circumstances where the host state severely circumscribes information, providing the public with pertinent objective information is a public service of open diplomacy. Supporting the emergence of local independent media which is an essential companion of democratic governance is a valued contribution by democracies, as is assisting the development of objective public broadcasting in transitional and emerging democracies.

Nota bene: independent media support has become a basic tool of public diplomacy. Though international communications services such as BBC World Service, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio-France, Al Jazeera, etc., are globally available, their transmissions are often jammed in crisis situations. The emergence of independent local media is an essential component of democratic governance. In its absence, regular communication of news bulletins and information by Missions can help fill gaps and correct the record on international or other matters, especially as authoritarian regimes are wont to expel foreign correspondents who criticize them. In such circumstances, diplomats can also serve as witnesses of developments otherwise hidden from international view, including indirectly back to the closed society itself via external broadcast services. Defense of journalists in support of Journalists without Borders and PEN International is an important part of human rights defense.

Such as: there are many examples of support for independent media in transitional situations, such as Ukrainska Pravda, or Feral Tribune, Croatia. The purpose of independent media outlets is commonly associated with political opposition, but from a developmental point of view, the existence of sustainable independent media able to monitor and advocate the quality of governance is an under-recognized but essential asset.

Multiple international programs exist to support the upgrade of journalistic norms. Diplomatic officers scout for candidates for individual journalist support programs particularly suited to the circumstances of the country. In Colombia, for example, the UK Embassy proposed safety training for journalists, and a training program to help them report more effectively on specific issues there, such as child abuse. In some societies with severe limitations on the press, Czech Embassies have provided non-political courses in basic film and media training – how to write an article, work with a camera, edit, promote.

Helping start-up independent media outlets has been an increasing activity in democratic development support. In Algeria, democratic governments contributed to such start-ups but at the same time supported the improvement and expansion of standards and coverage on the part of state press and broadcasting.

In post-authoritarian circumstances, state broadcasters in particular benefit from outside journalistic training. In South Africa, a consortium of public broadcasters from Australia, Britain, and Canada aided the conversion of radio and television from being instruments of state propaganda into responsible news and information organs. In all these transitional circumstances diplomatic Missions have useful contributions to make – in content as well as in training.

Helping to use the visits of foreign democratic leaders and their in-country press events is also useful. For example, in Algiers, the robust exchanges between visiting political leaders and their accompanying press corps had an exemplary effect on the normally passive local journalists witnessing the journalistic give-and-take of the visitors.

Access to outside news is crucial in societies deprived of communications normal elsewhere, as in Burma where the cost of cell phones is about \$2000, and where the regime has proposed to increase license fees for satellite TV sets from \$ 5 to \$1000, in an attempt to cut off access to outside information. In such circumstances, Embassy and Consular information offices, libraries, and cultural centers provide precious connections to the outside world. The American Cultural Center, Rangoon, is a survivor of the sorts of information outlets the US maintained decades ago, and plays a vital role in making books, DVD's, internet connections, seminars, and English lessons available to an avidly interested population. Burma's totalitarian regime which sporadically expelled foreign journalists as during the latest violent repression of demonstrations in 2007, also shut down Internet access. Certain democratic missions – Australia, the US, the UK and others – were able to report publicly to the outside what they were able to witness, and these reports were then played back to the Burmese via global news outlets and exile news organizations, often in frontier areas, where the state was not able to block incoming transmissions entirely. UK Ambassador Mark Canning has been objectively describing to outside journalists the “fearful and angry” mood of the population, and the likelihood “we are going to see more demonstrations”, since concessions granted by the regime are merely “tactical”. His words have found their way back to the Burmese public.

Diplomatic representatives are in a position to attempt to persuade local authorities to recognize that a freer flow of information is inevitable. A famous example of outside intervention of this kind occurred when senior Gorbachev adviser Alexander Yakovlev informed communist authorities in Prague in 1989 that their practice of jamming the broadcasts of Voice of America was contrary to obligations undertaken under the Helsinki Convention to which both the USSR and the CSSR had formally subscribed.

Working with the Government

- 5) *ADVISING*; helping government and civil society develop and sustain capacity for effective and transparent democratic governance is increasingly a core vocation of many diplomatic Missions and diplomats from Community of Democracies member states.

Nota bene: Wide-spread transitional assistance programs for democracy development and consolidation are often coordinated by diplomatic Missions which also have a role in scouting for opportunities, making contacts, and identifying programs which are not working, as well as helping to ensure that assistance takes account of local conditions, capacities, and needs. Diplomats in the field can also advise how to support groups in civil society most capable of encouraging bottom-up change essential to the process of democratic transformation.

Such as: considerable experience has now been accumulated concerning advice to governments managing democratic transitions, especially in Europe post-1989, and in Africa. Initially, emphases were on economic governance, but increasing attention has been paid to reforms aimed at improving machinery of governance and oversight, and deepening democratic accountability, as well as advising on how to encode human rights, legislative and electoral practices, and the role of civil society. Diplomatic representatives have even been able to advise on areas believed to be culturally sensitive by situating the advice carefully, such as the work of US Ambassador Barbara Bodine in counseling

Yemeni authorities on expanding the rights of women in Yemen.

The body of best practices over the years comprises a substantial record of different techniques. Some advice is derived from direct analogous experience, such as Chile's counsel to South African authorities on the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Often, regional programs to improve democratic governance have a special resonance as they draw more directly from experience of nearby countries which recently passed by roughly similar phases of democratic development. Diplomatic representatives who were part of that experience have a special credibility and role to play.

There is also a long record of ineffective or counter-productive practice, often from over-reliance on outside consultants with little experience with working conditions in the country. The founder of a Russian bank recalls asking outside financial consultants sent by an international financial institution to leave his premises, on the grounds their advice was hewn entirely from optimum conditions available in Western financial centers, but not in Moscow. He agreed to invite them back only if they first observed how local employees needed to relate to local conditions and capacities, and then tried themselves to function in the local circumstances before attempting to work together to upgrade the operation. It is up to donor missions to make the point that there may be an over-reliance on expensive outside consultants with little familiarity with local culture and practice, and to propose experts with more relevant expertise.

DIALOGUING; diplomats on the ground take part in, and supplement, regularly scheduled government-to-government human rights and democracy discussion which can place democracy development and respect for human rights at the center of the relationship, and signal that cooperation programs are conditional on improved governance. Such regular discussion can also serve to legitimize democracy development support work undertaken by missions in collaboration with local civil society. The promotion of dialogue processes to promote common ground in divided societies is a strong emphasis of such international NGO's as IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) which has undertaken several participatory dialogue exercises in support of positive change in such countries as Guatemala, Mauritania, and Nepal.

Nota bene: it is important that such government to government discussions be regular. They need to cover the "end-state" aims in democracy development and not be confined to specific human rights violations or outrages. In order to avoid the "fig leaf" effect of going through the motions for the sake of appearances, discussants should ideally not be limited to host country diplomatic authorities but also include authoritative representatives of "power ministries", as well as having the in-country support of security agencies of both sides.

Such as: many Community of Democracies members undertake human rights dialogues with partners under bilateral agreements, such as the "structural dialogues" of the EU, or the EU's monitoring obligations under the "essential human rights clause" of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean, and Pacific area partners.

Several partners of China maintain human rights dialogues with Chinese authorities. The EU and the UK have urged China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and have discussed how China might meet the requirements of Articles 6 (death penalty), 9 (arbitrary arrest and punishment), and 14 (right to a fair trial). China suspended their human rights dialogue with the US government in 2004 after the US co-sponsored a UN resolution criticizing China's human rights record, but in early 2008 agreed to resume regular discussion.

While any dialogue is better than none, the dialogues should always aim for some results on the broader picture of democratic governance; the risk is that reluctant regimes will only go through the motions and maintain the status quo in practical terms. Or self-confident countries feeling the pressure may simply refuse to hold human rights dialogues, as was the case of Iran with the EU.

That tendency to dialogue without practical effect is reinforced if the intelligence and security agencies of a repressive regime are absent from discussion of human rights, or worse, can claim the authority of ongoing privileged relationships with the security agencies of the sending democracy. Such a human rights and justice dialogue undertaken by the US Ambassador in Guatemala in 1994 was undermined by a parallel relationship of privilege and confidence between intelligence agencies.

Dialogues on human rights and democratic governance reinforce subsequent bilateral demarches by diplomatic representatives on specific cases, as discussed below. They can also serve as the place to establish the legitimacy both of diplomatic contacts with civil society, and indirectly to validate certain activities of civil society, without implying that the civil society groups are acting on anything other than their own domestic behalf.

Ultimately, of course, repressive regimes prefer to present decisions to moderate behavior as being taken in their own interest (which includes outside incentives) and not as a result of outside pressure. Dialoguing democracies should publicly defer to that preference, while privately keeping up the pressure.

Civic dialogue is also an increasingly used technique for promoting common ground solutions in divided societies or situations with challenging problems, where debate can often lead to divisive position-taking. For example, in 2004 IDEA (The Institute for Democracy and electoral Assistance of Stockholm) commissioned wide-ranging and broadly inclusive citizens' surveys in Nepal to determine citizens' conceptions of good governance, democracy, and human security at a time of constitutional stress. Results were presented by key stakeholders in civil society at "People's Forums". The delegation of the European Commission in Nepal took responsibility for hosting the presentation of the polls and surveys to the international community. The findings ultimately found their way into the constitutional processes, which benefited from the participation of experts with comparative experiences of constitutional processes in India, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Thailand, South Africa and Kenya.

- 7) *DEMARCHING*; using official channels to identify emerging or actual problems involving local authorities, to protest human rights violations, and to seek removal of restrictions and obstacles to reformers and NGO's, remains a classic tool of diplomats and Missions, best exercised as part of the above sustained dialogue on the status of human rights.

Nota bene: The technique of privileged diplomatic contact has also been very important in conveying messages to the host country about future conduct or further developments. Usually, such demarches are private. They may represent an alternative to public stands if these are judged apt to harden the authorities' positions, or otherwise be counter-productive. High-profile quarrels between an Embassy and the host government should not be allowed to displace the efforts of local democratic reformers which merit pride of place.

Such as: diplomats reminding host governments of international obligations had positive effect in many circumstances, most notably with regard to the joint undertakings under the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE, in Prague and other capitals in the late 1980's. Privately emphasizing to host authorities that they risk offending international public opinion at considerable national cost can also be effective, as was the case when religious authorities sentenced women to corporal or capital

punishment in Nigeria and Saudi Arabia.

As a peak form of intervention, direct warnings by accredited Ambassadors not to proceed with certain courses of repressive action are vital, such as the U.S. Ambassador's cautioning of Chilean authorities in the late 1980's, or warnings in 2004 to Ukrainian authorities they would be held accountable for use of force, and to desist from jamming mobile phone networks. Democratic Missions have been communicating similar warnings in Kenya about inciting ethnic violence.

There are multiple examples of diplomatic demarches on the conduct of trials, arbitrary imprisonment, and the treatment of prisoners. A vivid current example is that of US and EU diplomatic demarches to the Belarus government on behalf of imprisoned opposition politician Aleksandr Kazulin, who was "temporarily" freed in February 2008. International and domestic public opinion often argue for making the fact of such demarches public, but the record shows that with a variety of countries, especially China, diplomats have counseled keeping some initial demarches as private as possible, and have been rewarded by positive results.

Reaching Out

- 8) *CONNECTING* is related to "informing", but more in the sense of putting people in contact with each other. Bringing local reform groups and individuals into contact with outsiders is at the heart of people-to-people diplomacy, through such activity as visits, conferences, exchanges, and safe public access to the Internet or satellite communications from Mission libraries. Aims include enabling civil society to access assistance programs and international NGO's, and helping individuals connect to the wider world and pursue direct working relationships, as well as family ties. Connecting senior levels of government and members of the democratic opposition and society to contacts in the sending state are important tools. In more closed societies, the message from civil society outside that non-violent change is possible builds confidence and hope among civil society groups inside and even among more reform-minded authorities.

Nota bene: civil society is formed by a whole network of groups beyond the control of the state. Each component is usually devoted to specific purposes, such as women's and youth issues, human rights, ecological protection, HIV/AIDS, culture, or science. They value contacts with NGO's and others able to help them advance their specific interests. But their experience provides them with increasing legitimacy and influence. Taken together, they represent a foundation for democratic development.

Such as: there are several eloquent histories of groups of democratic activists and others inside who have connected to supportive groups outside, but none more effective than the connections arranged for the ANC in South Africa and then, for the United Democratic Front after its formation in 1983. Diplomatic representatives in South Africa maintained constant liaison with activists. Their ability to connect activists to supportive groups outside contributed to the preparation of personnel for the eventual responsibilities of government office. More immediately, connections were made by third parties and mediators to South African authorities or interest groups such as the Broederbund.

Support programs for civil society can also focus on leaders in exile, helping to provide the skills to enable them better to pursue their democratization goals, but also to help prepare a new generation of democratic leaders to assume office in a democratic transformation. Such programs have been instrumental in preparation from the South African experience to that of Burma today.

In repressive societies, diplomats can use modern communications technologies to circumvent travel restrictions against local human rights defenders or other activists seeking outside connections. In this

fashion, Cuban human rights advocate Oswaldo Paya (animator of the Varela Project, a citizens' petition aimed at promoting greater freedoms) was able to communicate by video to an EU NGO forum on freedom of expression after he was denied an exit visa. EU diplomats facilitated his connections by phone to EU ministers, journalists, and NGO's as well.

In Algiers, in the 1990's, it became the practice for diplomatic Embassies to make sure visiting dignitaries called on opposition leaders, which both connected these leaders to important outside contacts, and enhanced their legitimacy at home. Embassies in Ukraine 2003-4 developed travel programs to capitals for opposition leaders for similar reasons.

- 9) *CONVENING*; providing a safe locale for discussion, including among adversaries, has enabled contacts and exchanges aimed at the resolution of conflicts. Diplomats can also offer a venue for democratic activists to meet safely, helping them promote a legitimate status.

Nota bene: diplomats posted to third countries can also play a convening role vis-à-vis locally resident political exiles, as well as supporting visiting oppositionists from inside the country, or organizing confidential third country contacts between adversaries.

Such as: The first mediated and authoritative contacts between the ANC and South African authorities took place outside the country, and were sometimes arranged based on diplomatic liaison with the ANC offices in Lusaka. But Embassy locales in South Africa were often where South Africans of influence, such as the judiciary, first met ANC members informally.

Diplomatic officers can provide neutral ground for roundtable discussion on sensitive topics which would not be allowed in public, or for participants to speak off-the-record. US and Canadian officers frequently hosted such events in South Africa.

Publicly visible receptions to honor civil society, cultural groups, and political dissidents which were frequent at democratic Embassies in Prague and Budapest in the 1980's, help elevate the influence of protest and reform movements. Receptions also can have the merit of putting democracy activists and authorities together. Some Embassies, such as the Czech Republic's Embassy in Havana insist on such mingling and argue against the practice of other Embassies of holding separate national day-type receptions for civil society and authorities.

In transitional countries, Embassies can also play a convening role in helping to bring disparate parties and leaders together prior to democratic elections, as the US Embassy did in Liberia and Ghana, that facilitates their ability to work with one another later.

- 10) *FACILITATING*; using the good offices of Missions and diplomats to convene parties on ostensibly neutral ground in order to facilitate positive cooperation among democrats, reconciliation of different ethnic or other groups in pluralist societies, or encourage democrats and local authorities to seek to advance democratic outcomes. Diplomats can legitimately help peace activists with transmission of messages to others, and to the outside. Missions can also play a role in facilitating third-country peaceful abdication or exit strategies for discredited authoritarian figures.

Such as: at times of crisis, diplomats, especially from neighboring countries, can play an important role in encouraging the mediation of disputes, including in the aftermath of contested elections, though as in Kenya governments can also shy from mediation efforts. Robert Mugabe has resisted diplomatic attempts by South Africa and Nigeria to facilitate reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

Opposition movements often splinter into opposed factions. Diplomats in South Africa, Chile, and

Serbia helped opposition movements in these countries overcome their factional disarray and build united alliances for democratic reform.

Many of the divisive forces in societies devolve from ancient ethnic or tribal differences which can re-surface even in working democracies with sudden violence, as we have seen in Kenya. Some democratic embassies have pursued a special vocation in public and private diplomacy for attempting to mentor the reconciliation of ethnic division in such locales as the Western Balkans, Northern Ireland, the Middle East, Sri Lanka (especially Norway), Afghanistan, and Iraq by bringing to bear some of their experience with pluralistic societies. Settlement immigration countries as Canada and Australia have had specific expertise to offer in public and mediation diplomacy on migration issues in the Middle East and elsewhere. But when ethnic differences break down into violence, as in Kenya, it is essential that the democratic international community attempt to intervene. Their efforts in Kenya have been accompanied by diplomatic warnings that those responsible for inciting ethnic violence will pay a price by being barred in future from travel to the democratic countries concerned.

In societies where outside contacts are restricted, diplomats can pass messages and legitimately facilitate communications between democratic activists and outside supporters, or contact between ordinary citizens and family members and civil society elsewhere, using Embassy channels or Internet access.

Another technique of facilitation is “end-game” strategy offering “safe exits” to resolve acute crises. Such an exit for President Marcos of The Philippines de-fused the threat of violent resistance to democratic transition.

11) *FINANCING*; providing needed arms’ length resources to a range of local groups, individuals, and projects can be especially valuable to start-up NGO’s, independent media, or anti-poverty action groups. Often small projects avoid the sorts of government controls and bureaucratization associated with large-scale aid activity. But Embassies have the critical role of “spotting” for more substantial financing for larger projects which can be worthwhile.

Nota bene: Protests by authorities of “outside financing” are common and lead in many cases to curbs and restrictions. Precious financial assistance will be marred if it can be made to appear motivated by ulterior political considerations.

Such as: There are examples of fast-disbursing grass roots local initiative funds of diplomatic missions wherever there has been a democratic transition. Mission funds are not in competition with the programs of international NGO’s, which have longer-term development of civil society as a central purpose. Embassy-operated donations often go toward very specific and modest cash flow requirements of youth movements, start-up independent media operations, the organization of public events, or serve a humanitarian need in emergencies. Czech, Danish, and Norwegian funding today operates in such a manner in repressive societies. In the 1980’s, Canadian Embassy funds in South Africa could be deployed immediately to victims of apartheid to cover legal or other court costs. In countries in difficult democratic transition, such as the Congo, the funds can be rapidly directed to pockets of need, best carried out in consultation with other donors to avoid duplication and oversight. Such funds are often modest but for shoe-string beneficiaries have the merits of fast-disbursement and being unencumbered by paperwork obligations in emergency situations.

There is a record of allegations by repressive governments that such disbursements engage Embassies and diplomats improperly in internal matters of state. Authorities in apartheid South Africa and Pinochet’s Chile threatened expulsions over the practice, and in Russia in 2005, local reform groups and NGO’s which accepted such funds were penalized by denial of accreditation and their ability to

operate. It is important that such funding be at arms' length to specific electoral or partisan political purpose so that Embassies can vigorously contest any constraining action by authorities.

12) *SHOWCASING*; at the heart of public diplomacy, democratic development showcasing is less a matter of national self-promotion than an effort to offer solutions relevant for local application. By virtue of their outreach, Missions are in a position to highlight via seminars, training, conferences, and even cultural narratives, norms accepted elsewhere, best practices, and successful achievement which can offer models for the public, local authorities, NGO's and reform groups. As mentioned earlier, representatives of democracies which have themselves emerged from repressive regimes have enhanced credibility as mentors for human rights defenders and democratic activists today.

Nota bene: sometimes "best practices" which merit showcasing emerge from within the host country, such as economic, sports or social activities which cross ethnic lines. Exposing security forces to best practices in human rights and democratic practices via international training can help to prevent harsh reactions to non-violent protests; mirror discipline training for civil society in non-violent techniques can reduce the risk of counter-productive provocation.

Such as: democratic societies have had experience in many aspects of governance whose features can be immensely instructive to societies following in their path of ongoing transition, with the caveat that most applications are not directly transferable but need considerable adaptation to local social and cultural conditions. Some of the demonstration and assistance can be very specific and technical: Canada, for example, promotes guidance to multilingual societies on the practices of simultaneous legislative drafting to enable legal linguistic equivalencies. Especially compelling is training conducted by countries which have themselves emerged from repressive regimes, since the representatives of such newer democracies can more readily relate to the challenges and conditions of dissidents and civil society operating under the strains of repression.

But much public diplomacy is more general, in support of the merits of pluralistic accommodation, the peaceful settlement of disputes, or moderation in the pursuit of political objectives. Such showcasing efforts exposed Chilean opposition groups of the left, for example, which were somewhat doctrinaire, to the advantages of dialogue and pragmatic adaptation evident among successfully elected European social-democrats in the 1980's. Showcasing of exemplary efforts in non-sectarian hiring practices can help lead the way: the coffee growing industry today in Rwanda, for example, or in Northern Ireland where major Canadian employers hired across sectarian lines.

More general still are events presenting the cultural or other achievements of a democratic society to enhance its capacity to serve as a democratic role model. Again, the American Cultural Centre in Rangoon deserves close scrutiny as an example of a facility providing a people already possessing considerable acquired interest in the outside world sustained experience of international culture otherwise denied the by the repressive and inward Burmese military regime.

The showcasing of ethics for military and security personnel has only been accorded importance relatively recently, but with demonstrable beneficial effect. The training of Ukraine military officers in democratic governance responsibilities in NATO programs after NATO accession contributed to their restraint in dealing with demonstrations during the electoral crisis of the Orange Revolution. NGO-to-NGO training workshops which showcased the techniques of disciplined non-violent protest contributed to a counterpart restraint on the part of dissident and protest groups in those and other demonstrations.

By way of contrast, during the Cold War, counter-insurgency training in inter-American programs without an emphasis on human rights indirectly contributed to subsequent massive abuses by Latin

American militaries against democratic activists and others.

Defending Democrats

13) *DEMONSTRATING* support for human rights defenders, democratic activists, and reformers, by using the prestige and offices of the Head of Mission and other diplomats to show in public respect and even solidarity. This enables Missions to send the message that such citizens and groups have legitimacy and importance in the eyes of outside partners. Encouraging international humanitarian awards and recognition for human rights defenders also helps legitimize their positions in their own countries.

Nota bene: Public demonstrations or protests in authoritarian societies require courage and the willingness of citizens to entertain risks in the exercise of freedom of speech. Such courage merits support in public of their rights by democratic representatives, without however implying that outsiders are themselves acting in other than moral support. The public representation of sympathy by diplomats on specific issues or events can be used in tandem with private demarches to authorities. All diplomats need access to grass-roots activity and opinion but in presentation, it is important to demonstrate that the Head of Mission is the visibly engaged chief officer for human rights, while avoiding making him or her a lightning-rod for the hostility of host country authorities.

Such as: Historically, changes in repressive regimes occur because the people support change as their democratic right, expressed in most instances by public protests or demonstration. It is standard practice for repressive regimes to ban such gatherings, but the people often find a way to circumvent peacefully the states of emergency or special laws which authorities decree and erect to protect the undemocratic status quo. In apartheid South Africa, marches to public funerals of fallen activists became a vehicle for protest, and the presence among the people of the representatives of democratic diplomatic Missions sent to demonstrators and to authorities a message of support, as well as offering a shield of sorts against violent repression.

The role of diplomats in showing support for the rights to protest by appearing personally at such demonstrations has been established in such locales as Budapest, Santiago, Manila, Belgrade, Kiev, and Katmandu. Ambassadors such as Mark Palmer in Budapest made a point of being seen to be personally engaged with opposition and activist groups. Australian diplomat Roland Rich recalls that Indonesian pro-democracy demonstrators said at the time that “having foreigners alongside was like borrowing a little piece of their democracies”.

But demonstration of support for activists can also very effectively be private, in the knowledge that it will send a message to authorities monitoring communications. Maintaining regular phone contact with democratic opposition leaders has been a protective recourse in many crisis situations. More publicly visible are diplomats’ home visits to threatened or confined democracy activists, and the monitoring of political trials.

Again, receptions and other hospitality events which make a point of including both dissidents and officials can reinforce the self-confidence of civil society in the legitimacy of their peaceful work, as well as helping to create sometimes productive initial contacts between authorities and civil society leadership.

14) *VERIFYING and WITNESSING*; the verifying of election processes and results is an important and widespread international practice in which diplomatic missions have an ongoing responsibility. The witnessing of trials and hearings by diplomats is also widespread and is now

generally accepted internationally as a means of providing or supporting an independent verification of disputes, or the health of detainees. There are, of course, terrible histories of fearful and depraved repression of opponents and activists without any concession to pretense of legal authority, such as the tens of thousands of murders carried out by the Argentine military 1976-83. But today even autocratic regimes prefer to display the trappings of a legal process, however sham. In the Internet age, summary trials of dissidents and activists can rarely be completely hidden from view. “Show trials” meant to distort the truth for public consumption are similarly exposed for what they are. In taking public and private issue with the distortion of the process of justice for repressive political purposes, diplomats are representing the norms and standards of universally applicable human rights and the rule of law, and the arguments by repressive authorities that these matters are strictly internal concerns are without merit.

Nota bene: Enquiries and demarches about detainees and political prisoners need to focus on the illegitimacy of their incarceration, in addition to the conditions and circumstances of prisoners. International and diplomatic scrutiny of elections themselves is also by now widespread; but inadequate attention is paid to prior and ongoing support for the selection, formation, and training of preparatory and supervisory national election commissions.

Such as: diplomatic representatives have been prominent whenever possible at prosecution trials of democratic activists, journalists, and representatives of civil society, for example in Prague, Cairo, and Tashkent. Of course, there are still repressive jurisdictions where such trials are secret and closed, including recent mass sentencing of demonstrators and monks in Burma. The fate of such prisoners remains an enduring prima facie concern of missions. The very fact of incarceration is the forefront issue; presentation of “prisoners’ lists” to authorities in China and Cuba have been a mainstay of diplomatic representation for years.

The conduct of authorities is also an issue. Diplomatic representatives in various jurisdictions have insisted on verifying the health of such prisoners, such as after arbitrary arrests of Zimbabwe opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai and colleagues in the opposition MDC.

When violent prisoner abuse becomes public knowledge to the point that authorities are pressured to conduct official inquiries or even trials of security personnel, such as with respect to the killing of Canadian-Iranian photojournalist Mrs. Kazemi in Iranian hands, diplomats have sought to witness these legal proceedings as well, with admirable solidarity.

International election observation and verification, especially by regional organizations, is now an almost universal practice. Some democratic groupings have been able to provide such authoritative monitoring that they attract wide international participation, such as EU-led election monitoring in Lebanon, and the Congo, which included many non-EU observers among the team, or Commonwealth monitoring of elections in member countries.

The OSCE election observation missions (ODIHR) have become integral to the organization’s *raison d’être*. Though its bestowal of “failing grades” for elections, in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, or Azerbaijan, deemed not to be “fair and free”, is often ignored by authorities at the time, the accumulated challenge to their legitimacy is an important asset for diplomatic representatives in those countries.

The observation exercise does more than legitimize the election returns: as demonstrated in the case of South Africa, the presence of international observers provides encouragement and re-assurance to democracy advocates, and also security, by showing that the eyes of the world are watching. This helps promote restraint on the part of all parties to the process.

Embassies themselves and their personnel take an active role in the observation process, including significantly in verifying local elections, as was done in Ukraine by the Japanese Mission.

While democracies have increasingly placed governance at the core of development assistance programs and do emphasize aid for the election process, there has been less attention paid to the training of local election Commissions whose credibility is essential to sustaining belief in the integrity of results and avoidance of post-electoral violence as has occurred only recently in Kenya.

15) *PROTECTING*; “We were very active in attending political trials, so that defendants knew that if anything would happen to them, there would be protests” (Prague, 1980’s). Visible support for individuals and groups under threat, as well as their families, provides reassurance for democratic activists and human rights defenders and NGO’s. Ultimately, in the event of breakdown and crisis, Missions have performed an essential humanitarian function by giving refuge to asylum-seekers.

Such as: In periods of tension, diplomats can often defuse a crisis. Their presence on the scene may persuade security authorities to back off a violent confrontation with peaceful groups.

Protection can be implicit, communicated by signs of support, by telephone calls to check on the security of targeted activists, and by declarations. The authorities may seek to label such declarations as outside interference, indicating that protests are not authoritatively indigenous in inspiration. But as the Burmese confrontations illustrated in 2007, the people know when their protest and appeals for change are popular, and welcome supportive declarations as statements of solidarity endorsing the legitimacy of their popular cause.

Diplomats can cast a wide protective net. People arbitrarily jailed fear for their families. In Turkmenistan, the British Embassy made it a point to be in visible contact with the families of persons arrested for political reasons.

In more dire circumstances when the force of repression is without brakes, or beyond persuasion, the episodes of diplomats extending protection have been many, going back to the legendary work of Swedish diplomat Wallenberg during World War 2, or Varian Fry, US Consul in Marseilles, who, without much support from superiors, saved many artists, Jews, and leftists on Nazi arrest lists. It was Australian diplomat Bruce Haig who drove South African democrat and editor Donald Woods to safety out of South Africa.

Sadly, however, the list of Embassies which did not intervene or provide refuge because it was seen to be outside the scope of classically sanctioned diplomatic conduct was for many years a much longer one. But more recent practice has increasingly been to help wherever possible, as in the episodes of humanitarian acceptance of thousands of asylum-seekers in Santiago, Chile, after September 1973, the events of 1989 in Prague when Embassies opened their grounds to East German refugees, the assistance by the Embassies of Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia in gaining safe exit for threatened democratic opposition members, in Ukraine prior to 2004, or the acceptance by Australia of West Papua self-determination activists, 2006.

3. THE PARTNERS AND APPLICATIONS

In becoming “coherence agents” with specific skill sets, diplomats are usually more likely to be effective in their support of democratic development by a focus on practical applications than by the articulation of

lofty aspirations of political theory. The partnerships which matter the most are those with a human face.

A) People-to-people, democrat-to-democrat

- Local Groups, Coalitions – Students, Youth, Ecologists, Trade Unions

Coalitions of groups and bodies such as the United Democratic Front in South Africa are often the foundations of an emerging democratic society. In retrospect, they even constituted a form of government-in-waiting, though often, because of the closed circumstances of their society, they have little opportunity to gain the relevant and necessary experience. Their activities and primary interests may not even be political but through informal publications, performances, and public outreach, they can nonetheless spawn a growing sense of national identity and purpose. In the process they acquire a growing stature of legitimacy, reinforced by the efforts of democratic Embassies and NGO's to engage them as partners and provide them support and, as appropriate, training.

- Women's Groups

In many societies and situations, groups formed to defend and advocate on behalf of women are often the first experience women may have of personal involvement in public and social issues. Representing home and family perspectives as well as specific workplace or professional interests, women's groups have a central role in the emergence of civil society.

- Cultural Groups

As Alain Delatroz, Vice-President of the International Crisis Group recently wrote (in homage to a murdered theater director in Tashkent), "art is one of the finest forms of resistance to dictators".

The role of cultural groups in expanding the habit of freedom of expression was essential in many experiences in democratic transformation. As far back as 1975, Australian diplomat Diane Johnstone invited black artist Michael Muapola to her Pretoria apartment to exhibit his paintings to her guests, which incurred the wrath of the apartheid regime, but contributed mightily to African self-respect.

Cultural groups and artists have catalytic roles going beyond performance or art. Writing of Prague in the late 1980's, Canadian diplomat Rob McRae spoke of his introduction to Karl Srp, "the head of the so-called Jazz Section....of the musician's union (which) under Srp had become a hotbed of underground music and video production, as well as samizdat (clandestine) publishing." McRae subsequently observed that through culture, "a new civic society had begun to emerge outside the control of the state, with a whole network of underground publications, performances, exhibitions, videos, newspapers, artistic and literary 'salons'. These had started to reach beyond the opposition to the grey zone of individuals who were at least inwardly, if not openly, opposed to the regime".

- Human Rights Defenders

The work of human rights defenders in repressive societies is often lonely and is always courageous. Their cause is immensely assisted by the solidarity shown by the representatives of democracies, and the international acknowledgement of their efforts, such as the Nobel Peace Prize bestowed on Iranian human rights defender Shirin Ebadi. Chilean human rights lawyer Ignacio Walker (later Foreign Minister) recalls that over four years under the Pinochet regime defending hundreds of unjustly accused and jailed democracy activists, he won few cases in the biased courts, but the demonstrable support he received from Embassies and especially the Roman Catholic Church and the international recognition they bestowed, "saved many lives".

- Scholars, Researchers, Academic Institutes, Think Tanks, Centers of Excellence.

Connecting scholars to scholars and think tanks to think tanks is a multiple enrichment. For Embassies, partnerships and projects undertaken with the scholarly and research community often engage the future leaders of the country, however unlikely it may seem in repressive societies at the time. They also engage a country's construction of objective collective memory, which is important in building a process of reconciliation.

One of the most ambitious projects in preparation for the assumption of the responsibilities of government occurred as the result of a request made by Nelson Mandela shortly after his release from prison, to Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, to help the ANC boost its competence in economic matters. The initiative spawned the "Macro-Economic Research Group" (MERG) involving over 100 economic specialists from several developed democracies. Though the MERG report itself was eventually shelved, the exchanges and conferences involving ANC personnel constituted a very sound preparation for the responsibilities of office.

B) Institutional Partnerships and Processes

- Independent Media

The role of independent media goes beyond the healthy practice of speaking truth to power. Media, including the rapidly growing phenomenon of blogs, have a monitoring role on governance, and catalyze public discussion. Supporting the emergence of independent media outlets has been one of the consistently successful partnership activities of Embassies, often conducted in partnership with NGO's and news gatherers from Community of Democracies member countries.

Missions also on occasion directly help local news agencies and outlets with project funding. The first principle, of course, has been to separate such assistance from any intention of influencing the news or views reported by the outlet in question.

Support can be threefold. In Algiers, over the last several years, Embassies have encouraged the emergence of independent newspapers and outlets, without seeking to influence the news or editorial content of their publications. At the same time, they have encouraged the state-operated newspaper El Moudjahid in its efforts to present balanced reporting of events. Lastly, they have encouraged training for local journalists (who also benefit from the examples shown by traveling press corps accompanying visiting dignitaries of direct and candid questioning in pursuit of transparency and newsworthy information).

The transition to democracy from authoritarian regimes can be particularly challenging for public broadcasters as they transit from a propaganda role to one of objective reportage and news analysis. Such democratic arm's length public broadcasters as the Australian, Canadian, and British Broadcasting Corporations have mentored transitions, such as with the South African Broadcasting Corporation (with its 15 million daily radio listeners) at the behest originally of their resident Embassies, and after an initial grant by the Australian labor organization Apheda.

- Legal Proceedings

The rule of law and the building of national justice and judicial systems are essential to democracy-building. Some countries, such as China, hold to the "rule by law", but in a somewhat rigid way without the transparency and appeal systems which have developed in democratic legal cultures which invest parliamentary bodies with law-making prerogatives, and the independent judiciary with the on-going capacity for review and reversal.

In many countries, the legal and judicial communities play important roles in civil society. There are several recent examples of bar associations and even groups of judges taking public stands on issues of governance or corruption, such as in Burma, Pakistan and the Philippines. It can be rewarding therefore to develop Embassy partnerships and soundings with local bar associations, law faculties, and NGO's such as the Moscow Helsinki Group in order to support their efforts to improve the functioning of the court system, capacities for legal-aid. Embassies can also help to connect such groups to international norms and to experienced partner institutions in member states of the Community of Democracies.

- Political Parties

Obviously, paying attention to political parties and groupings, or democratic oppositionists, where they are able to function, represents one of the foremost activities of Embassies in the course of their work. Repressive regimes resent such attention to their opponents, and even some allies of democracies, such as Singapore and Iran in the 1970's actively discouraged such contacts, but diplomats can hardly do objective reporting in their absence, nor fail to support the right of beleaguered opposition parties to exist and travel outside the country.

Most definitions of democracy insist on the existence of a multi-party electoral system. Embassies obviously do not attempt to influence the electoral success of specific parties, but several are able to connect parties or groupings of one tendency or another to similar groupings in their home countries, where parties frequently have formed foundations for the purposes of such outreach. Examples include the German Stiftungs, the Swedish Olaf Palme Foundation, the U.S. NDI or IRI, or la Fondation Robert Schumann and la Fondation Jean-Jaures in France. Democracies also have multi-party Foundation models such as the Westminster Foundation in the UK, the Netherlands' Institute for Multi-party Democracy, the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, or the Norwegian Center for Democracy Support.

Some of the party-to-party mentoring is technical, and most is developmental without regard to specific policy choices or programs. But some political experiences of democratic parties in donor states have had a profound effect on the development of democratic options elsewhere.

- Security Agencies, Policing

It is commonplace that security is essential to the building of support for democracy and to development, and international agencies such as the Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces play an important developmental and counseling role.

Embassies increasingly pay attention to the opportunities to strengthen police training in transitional democracies via closer relations with local authorities. Even in repressive regimes, it has often been important to maintain productive contacts with security and police agencies. Indeed, elements of military and intelligence services have on occasion shown themselves to be among the more moderate components of hard-line governments. Embassies which partner with the police agencies for essential matters of cooperation against trans-national criminal activity, including anti-terrorism, have found these professional contacts could be engaged to lower the temperature at times of internal political confrontation.

- International NGO's And Organizations

Of all local partnerships for diplomats and Embassies, international NGO's are among the most valuable in the complementarity they represent to diplomatic activity. Such organizations as Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, the World Movement for Democracy, Amnesty International, the San Egedio Foundation, and developmental NGO's of all kinds such

as Oxfam, Medecins Sans Frontieres, CARE, World Vision, and, of course, such international organizations as UNHCR, UNICEF, the WFP, or the IOM reach segments of society in their work, and issues close to the ground, which are often out of reach to accredited diplomats. In several capitals, there are mixed donors' groups involving participation of Embassies, NGO's, and international organizations, for the purposes of information exchange and avoidance of duplication.

C) Capacity-building

This section is being completed in consultation with donor and recipient member countries of the Community of Democracies, international NGO's concerned, and centers of research on development assistance. It will be accompanied by an annex indicating how Missions might identify and contact NGO's and development organizations pertinent to their activities.

- Elections / Electoral Machinery/public education
The International Fund for Election Systems, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIR), the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Nations, the European Union, etc.
- Governance, institution-building, including environmental, gender equality
Member country programs, the OECD/UNDP democratic transition program, the Center for Democratic Transition, Budapest, the European Union, etc.
- Judiciary
International NGO's on the rule of law and judicial reform, international bar sections and associations on the role of defenders and legal aid, etc.
- Anti-Poverty and Humanitarian Relief
International NGO's, research institutes and international agencies.
- Health, Education, Essential Infrastructure
International NGO's, international financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank), humanitarian agencies, think tanks, research centers, and authoritative policy analysts, etc.
- Local, Sub-Federal, Ethnic, Tribal Groups
Federal member states of the Community of democracies, the Forum of Federations, etc.
- Human Security, including conflict prevention
The Human Security Network, the United Nations, international NGO's and foreign policy and security research centers, etc.

4. CONCLUSIONS

To be completed in sequence after the completion of the relevant case studies and consultation with stake-holders.

SOUTH AFRICA: “The Long Road to Freedom”

INTRODUCTION

The struggle for democracy in South Africa penetrated global consciousness as no other, engaging generations of international humanists, persons of conscience, and democratic governments the world over. The uniquely pernicious racial assertions of apartheid conveyed an almost universal sense of offense. Because of its inherent immorality and what Nelson Mandela described as “the ruthlessness of the state in protecting it”, the South African apartheid regime was singular in the extent to which it was regarded as illegitimate.

But the struggle to overturn it was borne by South Africans themselves.

Ending apartheid peacefully and establishing democracy in a unitary state would be only part of their battle. The challenges of governance and development for a majority whose skills levels had been deliberately suppressed were formidable.

Africans knew this. Mandela has written that the Freedom Charter of 1955, setting out the requirements of a free and democratic country, anticipated that “changes envisioned would not be achieved without radically altering the economic and political structure of South Africa”.

That the non-white majority acceded to power 40 years later in a country with established institutions was not in itself an advantage. As Nelson Mandela wrote, “Working as a lawyer in South Africa meant operating under a debased system of justice, a code of law that did not enshrine equality, but its opposite”.

A successful revolution occurred. But it is widely judged to have been a “negotiated revolution”, essentially non-violent.

The victory belonged to the people who had been protesting the apartheid laws since the Defiance Campaign of 1952. During the 1970’s, a wide array of more or less organized groups and initiatives emerged in support of the construction of a popular civil society and in opposition to the apartheid state. By 1983, these groups had become fairly coherently allied in the United Democratic Front, a working coalition of trade unions, student and youth groups, women’s groups, cultural organizations, and professionals, whose members, taken as a body, acquired increasing credibility and legitimacy as the civil alternative to the apartheid regime.

During those hard years, there had been many historic junctions on the “long road to freedom”. Several of these are associated with cruel violence, such as the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, or the Soweto uprising in 1976.

Faced with the regime’s ruthlessness, the ANC had decided in 1962 to desert 50 years’ belief in non-violence to accept the option of organized violence. But as Allister Sparks later wrote, Mandela “never had any illusions it could win a military victory.”

He was firmly “in the negotiation camp”. In eventual negotiations, beginning in the late 1980’s, the government side sought to oblige the ANC to renounce having opted for organized violence. The ANC committed to a future peaceful process but would not renounce its history.

In a sense this became the pattern for the negotiated outcome. The National Peace Accord of 1991 aimed

at a vast conflict resolution. With memories inhabited by an almost unendurable history, it was necessary to exorcize the past. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission would provide amnesty for deeds committed under apartheid in exchange for truth about them. This negotiated solution did not propose that apartheid's victims forget the past, but did enable all South Africans to go forward according to a formula in which blacks had to give up the pursuit of justice for crimes against them, and whites had to give up their monopoly on power.

Violence between black Africans, and notably Inkatha and the ANC, subsided with difficulty, taking the lives of as many as 25,000 in the 1990's, and criminal violence continues in South Africa to this day at unacceptable levels. But the "South African bloodbath" so widely feared and predicted was held at bay, at least as far as violence between whites and blacks was concerned.

The 1994 elections produced majority rule in a unitary state, but without the domination of the white minority by the majority in any punitive sense.

The successfully negotiated peaceful transfer of power was a mighty outcome to the struggle of South Africans over more than 50 years.

But looking back at the Wembley Stadium concert in celebration of Nelson Mandela and his people's struggle in April 1990, when he thanked the world's anti-apartheid forces for the "support and solidarity they had shown the oppressed people of South Africa", Susan Collin Marks reflected on "how easy it had been to cheer Mandela and how hard it would be to remake the nation".

That struggle endures. But South Africa's gifts to the world, through its history of a successfully negotiated revolution to effect a multiracial and pluralistic democratic society, also endure, as a model and a hope for many.

THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Once South African governments adopted institutionalized apartheid in the years following the Second World War, it was obvious that there would be a collision with the rest of a changing world.

From the time Ghana received its independence in 1957, the white regime in South Africa would find itself increasingly isolated by the "winds of change" sweeping over the continent, with reinforcement only from Rhodesia and the still-enduring Portuguese colonies.

Foreign support for the anti-apartheid struggle came from civil society -- trade unions, church organizations, parliaments, and a multitude of non-governmental organizations -- in many democracies, and, it should be acknowledged, support came from socialist countries allied with the Soviet Union as well. Outside South Africa, universities, research centers, non-governmental organizations and supportive citizens helped to sustain and train South African peace activists in exile, until they could return to participate freely in the process of democratic change.

International Diplomatic Activity

Diplomatic pressure over decades may have had only an uneven effect on the insulated apartheid regime's repressive laws but it undoubtedly helped to support the credibility of the ANC as an indispensable ingredient of any South African solution by the time ANC leader Oliver Tambo met with U.S. Secretary of State Shultz in 1987.

The international diplomatic community began to pronounce on the South African situation as early as 1960, when the United Nations Security Council condemned the killing of 69 demonstrators at Sharpeville. South African issues were always on United Nations agendas thereafter.

That same year African solidarity was extended to the ANC when Nelson Mandela visited and won the support of the great African figures of that time, including Haile Selassie, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Habib Bourguiba, Ahmed Ben Bella, Sekou Toure, and Leopold Senghor.

Such core African support was instrumental in persuading the Commonwealth of Nations to take activist positions against the apartheid regime, whose exit as a member of the Commonwealth had been steered shortly after the whites voted to declare South Africa a republic in the 1950's. By the 1985 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau, the members of the Commonwealth were able to adopt a program of sanctions against South Africa, despite long-standing reservations on the part of Prime Minister Thatcher of the U.K.

The Appeal For Sanctions And Boycotts

The ANC urged governments to ally together to introduce sanctions against South Africa whose purpose was to induce behavior change by imposing on the apartheid regime the psychological and economic costs of isolation. International sports and cultural groups halted South African tours and excluded South African teams. Universities disinvested South African holdings from portfolios for moral reasons, while multinational corporations re-located from South Africa for reasons of corporate strategy. Financial institutions re-considered lending practices to the South African state and its institutions. The World Alliance of Reformed Churches suspended the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa.

The imposition of sanctions was not without controversy. Apart from the impact on the economic interests of investors in South Africa, there was concern that sanctions would primarily hurt the economic livelihood of the black and colored population, a warning endorsed by such a democratic activist as South African opposition Member of Parliament Helen Suzman. But the fact that targeted sanctions had the full support of the ANC, which believed they were essential to the struggle, was judged to be decisive.

The South African state authorities estimated that the economic sanctions were "hurting but survivable". Perhaps, taken alone, they were, though the growing isolation of South African whites from the rest of the world added a psychological toll which did erode their willingness to support the extremist state authorities to the bitter end. That there would be a certain end was overwhelmingly due to the brave perseverance of non-white South Africans and their allies among the white population who over generations worked to obtain the justice of a democratic outcome.

International Popular Opinion And Support

Public opinion around the world grew to be massively supportive, stimulated in part by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1960 to Albert Luthuli who led the ANC at the time it was first "banned". In 1984, Archbishop Tutu who was a major force in forming the UDF won the Nobel Peace Prize again in the name of the South African struggle for justice.

During the intervening years, tens of thousands ANC, PAC, and other democracy activists had been banned and imprisoned but would not be abandoned by the world's attention. Night-long church vigils and "Free Mandela" events were frequent, often directed at fund-raising for the ANC, and for NGO's operating in South Africa.

Funding for South African democracy activists and NGO's had begun as early as the 1960's when Danish, Norwegian and Swedish trade unions and church groups launched the first programs in support of those involved in the struggle. Before long, they were joined by foundations and governments from many democracies in funding NGO's and reformers in South Africa, often with an emphasis on preparing for governance.

External funding was important to the ability of political organizations to finance the sorts of identity-cementing activities such as newspapers and events on which the struggle depended to sustain popular support over successive generations.

By 1983, this popular support pulled together under the loose grouping of the United Democratic Front (UDF), collecting under one roof trade unions, church and youth groups, cultural organizations, and a variety of locally-based civic bodies. The UDF was able in the circumstances when the ANC had been banned to become the main instrument for organizing popular protests and boycotts meant to counter the increasingly hard-line series of repressive laws and crack-downs associated with frequent states of emergency suspending rights and leading to mass arrests.

Change At Last

The position of the apartheid regime gradually unraveled as any remaining support from the international environment deteriorated. Zimbabwe had emerged in place of the racist allied regime of Rhodesia, and along with other front-line states, the newly independent Angola and Mozambique, and Botswana became locales for training camps for the ANC, and a platform for cross-border raids. The retaliatory effectiveness of the South African Defence Forces was increasingly handicapped by re-equipment difficulties because of sanctions, and the conflict's costs began to drain South Africa's Treasury and the population's support.

Once glasnost had transformed the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, it became much more difficult for the South African regime to continue to convince the white public the ANC was part of a communist conspiracy to take over South Africa, which the authorities had been alleging since the Rivonia trials of ANC leaders in the early 1960's,

Something had to give, and by the mid-1980's contacts encouraged by outside mediators. were taking place in Mells Park in the U.K. With funding from the Friedrich Neumann Foundation, the Institute for a Democratic South Africa organized discussions in 1987 in Dakar between the ANC under Thabo Mbeki and groups of white South Africans convinced of the need of a negotiated settlement, including the once hard-line Broederbond.

Negotiating Democracy

By 1989, the writing on the wall was clear for most to see. New South African government leadership under F.W. De Klerk accelerated the process and South Africa entered the phase of negotiation and preparation of majority rule.

The world's democracies played a significant role in helping to prepare ANC and other South Africans for positions of governance, through conferences, courses, and other forms of training for jurists through the Aspen Institute, economists via the Macro-Economic Research Group set up after Nelson Mandela visited Canada shortly after his release in 1990, and journalists via Harvard's Nieman fellowships. A major program undertaken at Australian initiative with the help of public broadcasters of Commonwealth countries was the cultural and organizational transformation of the propagandistic South African

Broadcasting Corporation.

Foreign experts also converged on South Africa to provide support for the preparation and observation of the democratic elections which would bring majority rule. As conflict mediator Susan Collin Marks has observed, they and other committed international helpers “gave an increased sense of security” to democracy activists “confirming the eyes of the world were on their plight”. They also “gave some real security as the police and army behaved with restraint in their presence”.

In the end, after a successful election and peaceful handover of power, it was the turn of South Africa to show the world what a negotiated revolution looked like, in the South African form of a multi-ethnic, multiracial, and multicultural society which could serve as a partial model for the bridging challenges faced in the Balkans, the Middle East, or elsewhere in Africa.

DIPLOMATIC RESOURCES IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THEIR APPLICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY

Assets

The diplomatic community resident in South Africa was not large, in part because the newly independent African countries did not have relations with the apartheid regime. Of the democratic countries present, those working informally and pro-actively together to support democratic activists and human rights defenders were relatively few in the 1960's and 70's but their numbers increased in the 1980's and were especially reinforced in the later 1980's when the United States became decisively committed to a democratic solution for South Africa.

South African authorities fairly regularly complained about diplomats' activities and Foreign Minister Pik Botha made a widely publicized speech in 1987 warning diplomats “not to meddle” in what he judged were South African internal affairs, and threatening curbs on diplomats' movements. He complained specifically about foreign funding (see above) for a trip by South African anti-apartheid activists to meet ANC personnel in Dakar.

The authorities tried to intimidate diplomats, sometimes with rather brutal methods. The Counselor of the U.S. Embassy, Robert Frasure (later killed on duty in Bosnia) tracked cross-border military movements of the South African Defense Force. Ex-UK Ambassador Renwick recalls that the SADF retaliated by “terrorizing his wife and children during his absences from home, to such an extent Frasure had to be withdrawn”.

More classically, a senior Canadian was shown in the Foreign Ministry photos taken of him at rallies and anti-apartheid events not just observing, but actively participating including joining in praying and marching. He was threatened with expulsion but countered that the only result would be to reduce the numbers at the South African Embassy in Ottawa, and to damage South Africa's image abroad.

The diplomat, John Schram, was able to do this effectively because it was clear the Embassy enjoyed the great asset of complete backing from his Minister and Government at home.

He was also able to play to the interest South African authorities had in diminishing if possible the international shunning which was solidifying around the world.

The fact that internationally, the world community was organizing its leverage against the apartheid regime was a helpful frame of reference for diplomats on the ground in reinforcing the legitimacy of their

activity. The declarations of Commonwealth Heads of Government Conferences, Summits of the European Community, the G-7, or resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, General Assembly, and its subsidiary bodies helped to cohere a common sense of purpose among affected diplomats in South Africa.

They represented often countries whose own histories had been propelled by democracy activists to which ANC members and others looked to for encouragement and examples: Gandhi, Dr. Martin Luther King, and later Lech Walesa, and democracy activists in the Philippines, were inspirations for the struggle, as were anti-colonialist leaders from Africa and leftist liberationists from Latin America.

Unquestionably, the funds which Embassies had at their disposal for small, fast-disbursing local grants, were important assets, especially as many of the beneficiaries had no funds of their own.

APPLICATIONS

The Golden Rules

Though there was world-wide dismay over the repression of the struggle for democracy in South Africa, it was most important to **respect** that it was indeed a struggle conducted often at personal risk by South Africans on behalf of their country's future, however universal the themes. As Ambassador Renwick phrased it, "The most that any Embassy could do was to try to help as a **facilitator** – and then let South Africans get on with a process in which too much foreign involvement was positively undesirable."

Of course, some Embassies leant considerably farther forward than others in such facilitation, no doubt reflecting the clear support they had at home, but it was always a problem for local diplomats when outside trainers in negotiation or mediation skills lost sight of why they were there to help. As Susan Collin Marks wrote, "Suspicion grew that many (foreign trainers) were driven by personal agendas, so that they were in it for what they could get out of it, not for what they could give.....training in South Africa, a conflict hot spot, gave credibility that enhanced their image elsewhere. Many of them would come into the country, give the training, and leave". It was up to Embassies to try to steer outside assistance to support continuity, but in cooperation with and in deference to the international NGO community which was closer to the ground and to the grief of the struggle.

Sharing among Embassies was fundamental, especially the most like-minded such as the Australian, Dutch, Canadian and Swedish who met frequently, in part to ensure their respective funding was not at cross-purposes, and that funds were distributed across a variety of needy organizations. Sharing of tasks also helped to ensure that there was usually present at trials, funerals, and demonstrations an array of representatives, effectively communicating the opprobrium of the wider world for the apartheid doctrine and regime, and encouragement for the non-violent struggle for justice.

Getting to the truth

Most democratic Embassies ensured that **reporting** of the situation was candid and precise, and benefited from the contacts of what one Ambassador called his "township attaches". The South African situation had achieved by 1985 a profile which meant that reporting from Embassies was avidly followed in capitals.

Of course, the situation was also covered by the foreign press, whose investigative reporting annoyed the authorities who, in a two-year period in the 1980's, expelled 12 correspondents from democratic

countries' news outlets, including the New York Times, the BBC, ITN, and CBS. This placed a greater onus on diplomats to play an **informing** role with their own home country news media to ensure the real story was getting out, as well as issuing information bulletins within South Africa, particularly to counter government-inspired slander. Former U.S. ambassador Princeton Lyman described how a predecessor, Edward Perkins, had "utilized the press to get his message across to the white population that the government of South Africa would never again have the opportunity to deal with people of the quality of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Thabo Mbeki."

A vital Embassy service was support for independent media. A number of Embassies such as Canada had a specific fund ("The anti-censorship fund") to help finance independent media such as the Daily Mail, including subsidizing subscriptions and advertising, as well as editorial and operating expenditures.

The South African Broadcasting Corporation had long served as a propaganda arm of the apartheid regime by the time that the negotiation of a constitution got underway in 1992. (The SABC helped over the years to account for such polling results as a 1982 poll which revealed that 80% of whites believed that communism was at the root of a struggle waged against the interests of a basically contented black population.) Yet, the SABC radio audience numbered at least 15 million and the transformation of the corporation into an objective news and information service became identified as a top priority by Embassies, achieved with the help of public broadcasting services from Australia, Britain and Canada. Upgrading the skills of South African journalists also became a priority through the work of the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism founded by Allister Sparks, and the creation of many exchanges and fellowships.

Working with the government

There was little sincere opportunity for working with the South African government on human rights issues prior to 1989, though some countries professed support for "constructive dialogue", and it could be argued that it did help to bring about a negotiated independence for Namibia. Embassies played an **advising** role in steering democracies to the means for helping a democratizing South Africa after 1989 to strengthen its capacities in the area of judicial training, constitutional advice, economic policy preparation, particularly via the Macro-Economic Research Group and also in supporting assistance to South Africa in disabling its emerging capability for nuclear weapons.

A particular contribution was made by Chile which was able to advise the new South Africa on the Chilean experience in creating a Truth and Reconciliation commission once democracy had been restored.

Several Ambassadors and Missions sustained **dialogues** with South African authorities. The Ambassadors of the U.K. and the U.S. believed their governments' reticence about sanctions served as carrots in moderating behavior. Ambassadors of the major democracies also claimed an "invisible mediation" role with the South African government once internal negotiations began, privately counseling the authorities as to where the "red lines" were for the international community's expectations.

But the most effective **demarches** to the South African authorities were often those which ensured that they knew their activities were being closely scrutinized internationally, especially in the anticipation of responses to demonstration and popular protest. Demarches were frequently made on behalf of democracy activists charged under the state with political and other crimes, including conveying the pleas for clemency for the lives of Nelson Mandela and fellow defendants in the "Rivonia" trials in 1964, by the leaders of the USSR and the United States, among others.

Reaching out

Connecting to civil society in South Africa and assisting its connections to NGO's and supportive institutions abroad was a critical ongoing responsibility of diplomats. Scanning for opportunities to connect African jurists to such as the Aspen seminars, or journalists to such as the Nieman fellowships, benefited from the close contacts democratic embassies maintained with lawyers' associations, and journalists. The Canadian Government had exceptionally created an autonomous Embassy-administered fund called the "Dialogue Fund" meant to promote connections with anti-apartheid groups of all sorts inside South Africa, and funded a variety of legal and independent media defense organizations in particular.

Such connections were put to use by Embassies and diplomats to **convene** activists and reformers together under a safe roof and then activists and opponents together. Jurist Richard Goldstone recalled his first meeting with representatives of the ANC at a critical turning point for South Africa when he had been appointed Chairperson of the Commission on Public Violence and Intimidation occurred at the Canadian Embassy. Black and colored entrepreneurs and economists were introduced to visiting business people around Embassy tables. Connections were also made by embassy personnel to South African security organizations.

Facilitating contacts was an essential service of democratic Embassies. But helping with communications within South Africa and to the outside was another way they could help, as certain diplomats noted of their experience.

Targeted connections enabled Embassies to pinpoint **financing** assistance, such as US AID funds which paid for the defense costs of democracy activists and human rights defenders placed on trial. The value to South African NGO's of even small but instant embassy grants able to finance the costs of publicity for demonstrations and such identity-reinforcing tools as newsletters, t-shirts, and the like, was very high.

Diplomats **showcased** applicable models of social and economic policy from home, and Embassy assistance programs tried to create public events which enabled democracy activists and representatives of civil society to participate as visible counterparts. Some aspects of governance from democracies had to be re-considered in light of internal debate in South Africa, such as federal solutions, and multiculturalism, both of which were seen as ways in which the ascent to democratic power by the black majority could be diluted.

Showcasing could also occur in an inverse direction. As long ago as 1975, Australian diplomat Diane Johnstone invited black artist Michael Muapola to her apartment to enable him to show his drawings to her guests and help publicize and validate the strength of local culture. Within days, vengeful forces of apartheid had her evicted from her apartment which had first been ransacked. Mr. Muapola was harassed by authorities for years. But the episode was widely appreciated by the black population.

Defending democrats

Demonstrating such solidarity with the struggle was at the core of the new public diplomacy for democratic Embassies, engaging embassies in field visits and visits to the offices of human rights' defenders. John Schram recounts, "the importance of putting across the message to those in the struggle that they had essential international support". As U.S. Ambassador Lyman wrote of his predecessor Edward Perkins, the first African American ambassador to South Africa, "he stood out in the crowd attending the all too frequent funerals of activists slain during the state of emergency in the late 1980's". He was not, of course, alone. Describing the funeral for 17 activists killed in 1986, Alan Cowell of the New York Times noted several "diplomats from the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands,

West Germany, and France”.

It had its honorable risks. After PW Botha announced the banning of the UDF in 1998, a peaceful protest march on Parliament was broken up violently by riot police who arrested among many, many Africans, Bishop Tutu, Allan Boesak, a BBC crew, and the wife of Canadian Ambassador Ron McLean.

Verifying trials of anti-apartheid activists had been a duty of democratic embassies from the time that Nelson Mandela observed that his 1963 “Rivonia” trial was attended by “dozens of representatives of foreign governments”. Countless trials were witnessed, both as a caution to the authorities and as a form of **protection** to the defendants. Embassies made numerous demands of the government for independent investigations of the use of force against anti-apartheid protestors.

“Anti-apartheid organization members sometimes asked representatives to be present at police sites to witness and/or prevent violence”. Protecting democrats from the ruthless power of the state was sadly not possible for the thousands who were abused, but diplomats were able in demonstrations and protests to “put themselves between the police and the protestors, and may have helped to mitigate some of the violence and prevent violence against demonstrators”.

CONCLUSION

The words of President Mandela at his inauguration on 10 May, 1994 remain an ideal for all:

“We enter into a covenant that we shall build a society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity”.

That diplomats were able to participate in support for the South Africans’ struggle for democracy is a record and precedent of great merit for their profession. The South African struggle continues today, for development, security, and opportunity, and the need of South Africans for the support of democratic friends is undiminished.

From Independence to Real Democracy – Ukraine’s Orange Revolution

INTRODUCTION

Advocacy for fundamental human and civic rights, as articulated in the Helsinki Final Act, increased considerably in the 1980s in the USSR. Residents of the then-Soviet republic of Ukraine were especially and deeply affected by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 and the subsequent cover-up. The loosening of strictures on fundamental human freedoms promoted under glasnost allowed these concerns to be articulated, and a growing crop of democratic activists came to the fore. The erstwhile communist leadership of Ukraine declared its independence in 1991, realized following the final dissolution of the USSR in late December of that year. Ukraine was recognized as a new “emerging democracy,” though the simultaneous transition from a totalitarian model to a newly independent democracy would be a massive challenge. Ukraine’s new leadership, new political parties, and civil society all requested assistance in their democratic and market transformations, and this help was forthcoming from early on from the democratic world. Ukraine also proved a willing partner in the efforts to ensure nuclear stability by giving up its nuclear weapons by 1994.

Also in 1994, Ukraine held its first democratic presidential elections, won by eastern rocket scientist and industrial manager Leonid Kuchma after a fraught campaign against incumbent – and former communist-era boss – Leonid Kravchuk. Throughout this period, Ukraine continued to receive external support for reform processes, including backing for all manner of civic engagement in public life. It also included technical support for and observation of democratic elections, consistent with Ukraine’s obligations as a member of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE – the post-Cold War institutional product of the Helsinki Final Act) and the Council of Europe to improve, ensure, and promote public confidence in the process.

Yet the connection between political and economic power, with the dominance of competing regional industrial “clans” became more apparent, with attendant allegations of senior corruption. Ukraine’s star began to fall with much of the democratic world, a trend accelerated by the murder of Georgiy Gongadze, a prominent journalist for the independent internet publication *Ukrainska Pravda*, who had been investigating official corruption. Soon thereafter, opposition leaders released recordings they said implicated Kuchma and others in his inner circle in the murder, serving to galvanize a large segment of public opinion against the government.

The 2002 parliamentary elections gave the opposition unprecedented representation. There was relative transparency due to civic efforts to track the vote through exit polls, and the results greatly boosted the democratic opposition. The polarization of the political landscape intensified, with presidential proxy attempts to amend the constitution and flawed by-elections in the western district of Carpathia in April 2004.

The still-unsolved dioxin poisoning of opposition presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko deepened the polarization of Ukrainian politics. The 2004 Presidential election campaign, according to international observers of the OSCE, exhibited numerous instances of bias and abuse by the authorities. A second round characterized by blatant and systemic fraud galvanized public protest. Demonstrations began on election night in Kyiv and grew exponentially, drawing large numbers unforeseen by the Ukrainian activists who had anticipated fraud and planned the protests. These demonstrations soon snowballed into the Orange Revolution.

The democratic world recognized the importance of helping Ukrainians ensure that the 2004 presidential elections were free and fair. In transparent view of the Ukrainian authorities, diplomats assisted Ukrainian citizens in monitoring and upholding the democratic process. The cooperation among embassies in this effort was unprecedented.

Ukraine's case involves the full array of assets that democratic diplomats have at their disposal, as well as the numerous ways that these can be applied to support civil society and the democratic process.

RESOURCES AND ASSETS OF DIPLOMATS IN UKRAINE, 2004

The G-7 democracies began close cooperation to support Ukrainian civil society and the electoral process in 2001, prior to the 2002 parliamentary elections. In 2003, this was formalized in a G-7 EU-Canadian-American-Japanese process through their ambassadors in Kyiv, focused on information-sharing and coordination in support of free and fair elections, and in alerting home authorities to trends and developments.

These diplomats had considerable **influence** in Ukraine, due to their countries' support for Ukrainian statehood and state-building, reinforced by the expressed desire of most of the Ukrainian political spectrum – including the Kuchma administration – to shift Ukraine's orientation toward the West, to the EU and NATO, and even eventually to apply for membership status, all of which elevated the importance of the democracy and governance standards.

Diplomats' ability to marshal **funds** proved an essential asset in their effort to support a transparent and fair electoral process. This included any post funds they could disburse to Ukrainian civil society actors, and also their role in advocating programming by international NGOs and donors, adapted to the flexibility required to operate in a fast-changing environment.

Democratic embassies expressed **solidarity** by working together and supporting projects financially and operationally that connected democratic activists from countries that had recent civil society-driven democratic breakthroughs, including Slovakia, Serbia, and Georgia, as well as an effort to bring election observers from other countries in transition.

Finally, diplomats had a strong platform of **legitimacy** to draw upon in Ukraine, given the country's obligations to observe clear human rights and democratic standards as a member of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The OSCE's Copenhagen Criteria provided a regular talking point for democratic diplomats in Ukraine before and during the Orange Revolution. In conjunction with subsequent OSCE statements that threats to stability were not just internal affairs, these provided western Ambassadors a ready riposte to Ukrainian MFA complaints of interference.

WAYS THESE ASSETS WERE APPLIED TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN UKRAINE

The above Assets were creatively and effectively applied in all the methods categorized in the preceding Toolbox chapter. Examples of each will be discussed in turn, some of which involve two or even more ways of deploying these Assets.

The Golden Rules

Listening, Respecting, and Understanding: Diplomats recognized the differing roles and capabilities of

partners in the effort to ensure the fairness and transparency of the 2004 election, and, over time, seemed to develop a process that allowed each to play to its institutional strength. The mechanisms developed in the working-group process (see sharing below) actually seemed to be designed around these realities. According to a seasoned civil society advocate and former funder, “People need to work together while maintaining their autonomy.” One Ambassador told a civil society roundtable when it was launched in early 2004, “You do what you intend to do. Let me know if you come under pressure – I’ll help.” In disbursement of assistance, the relatively small sums managed at post allowed embassies to dispense with procedures that might impede quick reaction. Rather than simply finance trainings and workshops, diplomats made, facilitated or encouraged grants that enabled civic activists to act within their remit. This is not necessarily common.

Sharing: As mentioned above, efforts to share information and coordinate policy approaches on Ukrainian democratic development began in 2001 among G-7 members. The Italian and then Dutch EU presidencies took an energetic role in bringing all the EU members into the process. The monthly meetings were chaired by Canadian Ambassador Andrew Robinson, with the US and EU as co-chairs. Japan remained engaged (and also had observer status at the OSCE). Different members came to the process emphasizing different goals for the group: the Americans stressed more coordination while Canadians and others were more interested in information exchange. According to Ambassador Robinson, these approaches complemented each other.

Truth in Communications

Reporting: Democratic embassies had established relationships with relevant political actors, media, and civil society organizations, as well as among themselves. This broad proactive information collection allowed them to inform and help direct their countries’ policies. Canada’s diplomats in Kyiv at the time felt that they were able to wield significant influence because of their reporting. Information sources later included election observers in the field, especially the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) long-term observers, who remained in the field during the revolution, when it was unclear whether there would be a continuation to the electoral process.

Informing: In this area, diplomats coordinated their activity to ensure that independent media, such as internet daily *Ukrainska Pravda* received sufficient funding to continue its important work of providing uncensored news, including from embassies’ own post funds. The U.S. embassy made one such grant to editor Yulia Mostova to finance *Zerkalo Tyzhdeny* (“weekly mirror”), an internet publication with serious analytical and investigative pieces, many of which were (and remain) translated into English for an international audience. USAID and the Open Media Fund also supported media monitoring of television content, the prime news source for most Ukrainians. The OSCE-ODIHR Election Observation Mission publicized its own independent media analysis, showing the strong slant on almost all television networks for the incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich and against the opposition candidate Yushchenko, both in quantitative (relative air time) and qualitative (tone) terms.

Working with the Government

Advising: From the advent of Ukrainian independence and democracy, diplomats were engaged in advising both Ukrainian government institutions and civil society actors in democratic governance and economic reform. Much of this engagement was direct, both with governmental actors and with Ukraine’s civil society. But it required an even greater mobilization of home authority resources to fund programs.

Dialoguing: On election and governance issues, the OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine office served as a focal point for regular discussions among the civic sector, Ukrainian government, and diplomatic

actors. No embassy or government funding or assistance was undeclared; the government could in no way claim to have been uninformed about diplomatic and international donor activity prior to and during the electoral cycle.

Demarching: “The position of the diplomatic corps was taken very seriously by the authorities,” according to a prominent opposition figure, and their statements influenced the authorities on numerous occasions throughout the electoral process on the need to adhere to democratic norms to which Ukraine was a party. Two examples stand out.

The first was a reaction to the widely held fear that the mobile phone network would be shut down for the election night vote count, effectively atomizing civic and opposition efforts to coordinate verification and post-election activities. Opposition figures warned the democratic embassies of the threat, and these diplomats played a key role in summoning official reaction from their capitals. European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and high-level State Department officials called President Kuchma directly to warn against an engineered communications blackout on election night. The phone networks remained active throughout the election and post-election crisis.

In another instance, taking their cues from their embassies and the OSCE-ODIHR Preliminary Statement on November 22, the democratic world coordinated its expression of lack of faith in the second round election results. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the U.S. “cannot accept the...result as legitimate,” and called for an investigation into electoral fraud, with consequences for the Washington-Kyiv relationship if this did not occur.

Reaching Out

Connecting: Democratic ambassadors and diplomats were a crucial link between Ukrainian civil society and the full political spectrum in their home countries. Senior opposition campaign staff credited the Polish, U.S., French and German embassies with helping them connect with NGOs and political figures in their capitals. Such connections proved especially important during the post-election crisis that became the Orange Revolution. According to another senior opposition figure, diplomats also used “their connections with different camps to deliver messages.” The embassies facilitated similar links with their home authorities and civic sectors, including with Rada (parliament) speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, who played an important role in the post-election crisis roundtable mediation led by Polish President Aleksandr Kwasniewski, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, and EU Common Foreign and Security High Representative Javier Solana.

Opposition figures credit democratic embassies for facilitating an early 2004 conference in Kyiv, which drew from the full Ukrainian political spectrum and many senior external actors; later in the year former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright adopted and promoted the idea of visa bans and asset freezes on Ukrainians responsible for impeding a fair electoral process. Indeed, a prominent Kyiv oligarch and MP, Hrihoriy Surkis was denied entry to the U.S. A longtime Yushchenko advisor summed up the significance of this message to others not yet affected – “you will lose your honestly stolen money” if you try to steal the election. This had “the most effect...even on Kuchma himself.”

Convening: Most Western ambassadors hosted dinners at which political actors from across the entire political spectrum met, along with civic leaders, in “open and informal” discussions with political opponents that would not have occurred otherwise.

Facilitating: The opposition attributes the most significant facilitation by external actors in Ukraine not directly to democratic diplomats, but rather to an international NGO, the National Democratic Institute.

NDI actively helped to mediate and broker the coalition among Our Ukraine Presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko, the bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, and Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz. Moroz was the third-place finisher in the first round of the election and possessed valuable party infrastructure in northern and central Ukraine that the Yushchenko team needed for the second round.

U.S. Ambassador Carlos Pascual encouraged NDI and IRI party assistance programs to be open to the full political spectrum. Their popularity even with “parties of power” helped ensure that they could continue activity despite post-2002 government efforts to prevent their registration.

Financing: Democratic embassies engaged in some direct financing of civil society activities related to the electoral process, but the lion’s share of external funding for Ukrainian civil society came from development agencies, international NGOs, and foundations. Development agencies like Sweden’s International Development Agency (SIDA), Canada’s International Development Agency (CIDA), and USAID, had been fixtures on the donor scene since Ukraine became independent. But local civil society actors note that there appeared to be a lack of strategy and local knowledge in the international donor approach for some time. The Gongadze murder galvanized the political atmosphere. Democratic embassies feared for the integrity of the 2002 parliamentary elections, so the need for greater strategic coordination of donors and policy in support of electoral process was apparent. With training and funding to conduct exit polls for the 2002 elections, “the international community set the bar” for electoral transparency, according to a former ambassador serving at the time.

The diplomatic and donor community put together an array of programs designed to facilitate professional conduct, civic participation and verification of the 2004 presidential elections. According to a key diplomat involved, the level of coordination was “absolutely fantastic.” The system functioned as a clearing house, allowing donors to know what others were doing, identify gaps, and enabled them to volunteer resources to fill those gaps. The resulting breadth of civil society programs was considerable, including funding for domestic and international election observers, voter education and mobilization, independent media (thereby *informing* the Ukrainian public), exit polls and parallel vote counts. Eight western embassies and four NGOs mounted a modestly-priced effort to fund exit polls in both original rounds of the election: “money extremely well spent” according to Ukraine specialist Andrew Wilson.

In light of the circumstances, donors demonstrated great flexibility in order to get the job done. Civil society actors remarked that quality project ideas could get funded without inordinate difficulty, though donors shied away from more “sensitive” activities that might be perceived as partisan. Diplomats and civil society figures interviewed consistently stated that funding was granted to support the electoral process, and not given to parties or partisan projects. A western ambassador and a senior Ukrainian civil society figure agree that civic groups not explicitly political – such as business development and environmental groups – were as relevant as those with a political focus. The government “didn’t get that this was a broad question of civic engagement in public life,” according to the diplomat.

In addition, there were considerable efforts to work with the authorities to assist their capacity to conduct a proper electoral process. The Central Election Commission, lower-level electoral administrators, and judiciary all received technical advisory assistance and training.

Showcasing: According to a Ukrainian think-tank veteran now working to reform government administration, diplomats are especially well situated to impart the “lessons of democracy,” such as the function of coalitions, cohabitation, conflict of interest, and legal accountability. “The success of western assistance was the sharing of knowledge and skills of how democracy works,” in her view. Discussion of basic democratic and rule-of-law mechanics can be very instructive. Diplomats have engaged in roundtables on such issues to great effect. Democratic activists from Slovakia, Serbia and Georgia – sponsored by grants from the diplomatic corps and foundations – reinforced a conclusion most Ukrainian

democrats had drawn from their own earlier failed protests – that nonviolence is essential to succeed in mass civic mobilization.

Defending Democrats

Demonstrating: Diplomats at all levels demonstrated their solidarity with Ukrainian citizens exercising their right to peaceably assemble by visiting the *Maidan* (Kyiv’s Independence Square) throughout the crisis. “I could see the representatives of all diplomatic missions...this was at the ambassadorial and staff level,” recalls a senior opposition logistician on the *Maidan*. “I saw (embassy) staff taking coffee and sandwiches to demonstrators.” In a less visible way, one democratic ambassador called an opposition campaign figure multiple times daily, telling him he did so in the knowledge his calls were monitored. He wanted the authorities to know they were in regular contact.

Protecting: Diplomats were among the international observers who monitored the mayoral election in April 2004 in the western town of Mukachevo, and witnessed serious intimidation and violence. The OSCE, Council of Europe, European Union and the US criticized these violations. The opposition credits the Czech, Slovak, Polish and Hungarian embassies with ensuring that the family of opposition candidate Viktor Baloha, could escape to safety.

On the night of November 28th, U.S. Ambassador John Herbst heard from both the opposition and from government sources that Interior Ministry troops were being sent to clear the *Maidan* by force. There was serious potential for violence. Herbst called Washington, and Secretary of State Colin Powell attempted to reach President Kuchma, to communicate the message that he would be accountable for any violence that might ensue, while Ambassador Herbst himself passed the same message to Kuchma’s son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk and Chief of Presidential Administration Viktor Medvedchuk, regarded by many as the chief advocate of a crackdown. It is impossible to know what factors, in what proportion, tipped the balance in getting the troops to stand-down – there were also flurries of messages from Ukrainian Army and secret service officials warning against a crackdown, as well as opposition figure Yulia Tymoshenko meeting with the Army commander. A senior diplomat believes that “perhaps the Army was more important.” But these messages no doubt made an impression. “This was a moment when the international community showed solidarity,” according to one senior opposition figure.

Witnessing/Verifying: Diplomats not only engaged in their normal observation and reporting duties (including following the proceedings of the Rada and Supreme Court), but also traveled to observe distant campaign events and to investigate alleged abuses of state authority. They observed elections throughout the country, many as part of the International Election Observation Mission, built around the OSCE-ODIHR mission, and led by a representative of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. But such witnessing was not restricted to high-profile events: Japanese embassy personnel were among the observers in a municipal election in the central city of Poltava prior to the 2004 presidential poll.

One current presidential advisor recalls a bus trip he organized for a cross-section of the diplomatic community to the eastern city of Donetsk, the center of Prime Minister and “party of power” presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich, enabling them to learn firsthand of the difficulties the opposition had in holding events in the east.

In the tense last two weeks before the first round, the government began a new tactic: raiding civil society group offices, planting then “discovering” explosives, and charging these groups with planning terrorist acts. Civic campaign PORA (“It’s Time”) offices were raided on October 15th in the first iteration of this approach. On the morning of October 23rd, security service officers appeared at the home of (Yellow) PORA leader Vladyslav Kaskiv, demanding to be let in to search for weapons. In the case of Mr. Kaskiv,

two opposition MPs blocked the door and prevented a violent entry by using their parliamentary immunity. Three diplomats from the French Embassy and other international representatives from the OSCE, OSCE-ODIHR, and European Commission arrived to reinforce the MPs and forestall a violent break-in by the security personnel. Their presence had the desired effect: after a number of hours, the authorities withdrew.

CONCLUSION

The 17-day Orange Revolution, after many tense moments, succeeded. Mass popular discontent changed the equation, leading state institutions to reassess their roles and responsibilities. The Supreme Court and then Rada determined that the people would have another chance to express their will with minimal interference.

Despite the deep-seated tensions in a divided society, and concerted efforts to inflame them for political advantage, Ukrainian society as a whole showed remarkable restraint in avoiding violence throughout the crisis. As historian of Ukraine and its revolution Andrew Wilson succinctly put it, “it takes two sides to avoid an argument.”

Continued engagement is needed to help Ukrainians to secure the advances that they have made. According to one Ukrainian policy and administration analyst, “Once dictators are out, democracy doesn’t just flourish...Here democracy is only regulated in elections...After elections, we’re flying blind.” The full diplomatic toolbox now needs to be applied to assisting Ukrainians – especially the agents of civil society – to institutionalize democratic norms.

The Fall and Rise of Chilean Democracy: 1973-1989

INTRODUCTION

Chile's Drift into the Abyss

Chile historically prided itself on its long democratic and constitutional practice, as well as its relative moderation in politics. Unlike many of its neighbors, it experienced military rule for only brief intervals totaling slightly over a year. The armed services maintained a solid professional distance from politics, and even public life.

But Chilean politics became increasingly rancorous and polarized in the 1960s. A division into left, center, and right permeated Chile's civil society. One Chilean, looking back on the era observed that by that point "moderation was always interpreted as a sign of weakness. Anyone who was moderate was presumed to have a sort of complex."

In 1970, Socialist Salvador Allende, the candidate of the left-wing Popular Unity coalition, won the Presidency in 1970 with a 36% plurality, confirmed in the parliament. His victory raised political polarization to new heights. When the economy became rattled in 1971 by investor and market reaction to government intervention, tension between the government's supporters and its critics increased until the parliament, in which Popular Unity did not hold a majority, adopted in 1973 a resolution accusing Allende of regularly violating the constitution and attempting to institute a totalitarian system. It was openly speculated that a coup d'état could follow.

Coup d' État and Repression

On September 11, 1973, the armed forces of Chile forcefully took over, bombing and storming La Moneda, the presidential palace in Santiago, against armed resistance, to find President Allende dead by his own hand.

Army General Augusto Pinochet led the armed forces commanders' junta, declaring that Chile was in a "State of War."

The repression against supporters of the Allende government and anyone deemed threatening was immediate and overwhelming: roughly 7000 persons were detained, brutally interrogated and tortured at the National Stadium, and scores summarily executed. Thousands ran to foreign embassies for protection. Violent repression also struck in rural areas, where it was more difficult to find refuge. Thousands were arrested and many simply "disappeared."

The judiciary, overwhelmingly partial to the coup, did not resist the blatant illegalities being perpetrated, nor did they seek to exercise their prerogatives when civilians were being brought before military tribunals, and often executed. Almost no petitions for *habeas corpus* were accepted.

While many Chileans welcomed the putsch, most believed that the armed forces would return to barracks and allow a return to civilian and democratic rule. They soon learned this was a false hope. Pinochet banned leftist political parties outright, suspended others, and in 1974 ordered the electoral rolls destroyed.

Church vs. State – Defending Human Rights

The Catholic Church was the only institution capable of resisting the junta's repression. Chilean civil society and any political actors remaining in Chile hunkered down in the aftermath of the coup, concerned with mere survival. "The myriad institutions of civil society, including neighborhood organizations, sports clubs and professional associations, were prohibited from meeting or tightly controlled," according to the then-Ford Foundation representative in Santiago.

Fortunately, Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez gave support to those threatened by the junta. The ecumenical Pro-Peace Committee defended victims of human rights abuses, but was closed by Pinochet's order in 1975. The (Catholic) Vicariate of Solidarity succeeded it, helping an estimated 700,000 Chileans with legal, health, occupational and nutritional services between 1975 and 1979. International civil society was instrumental in financially sustaining these efforts.

The Church also supported the legal and evidentiary work to defend human rights, before a judiciary nearly totally sympathetic to Pinochet. According to Jaime Castillo, a pre-Allende justice minister who represented hundreds of prisoners and missing leftists, "judges almost always reacted negatively to us; they were servile and afraid, and so bitter against the Popular Unity (Allende's government)." Ignacio Walker, later to serve as foreign minister after the return to democracy, recalled, "As a human rights lawyer, I lost all my cases...But winning wasn't the point. We could still protect people by making their cases publicly known. The cost was higher" for the regime to do them further harm. The World Council of Churches in Geneva played a pivotal role in publicizing such cases. While this activity was nettlesome to the regime, it was tolerated. Confronting the Church would spur social resistance in predominantly Catholic Chile. The voluminous documentation collected throughout the post-coup years on arrests and locations of detention became instrumental in establishing the truth of what happened to thousands of Chileans deemed "enemies" of the regime.

What was preserved and accomplished in these especially harsh years provided the building blocks for Chile's democratic revival.

Authoritarian "Institutionalization"

While in theory the first among equals in the junta, Pinochet proved more politically skilled at infighting than his rivals. He rapidly personalized and consolidated power, pressuring the junta to confer upon him the title "President of the Republic." Pinochet claimed it was his destiny to rule, and set out to remake Chile with a "protected" political order that would preserve his role far into the future.

Following the UN General Assembly's condemnation of the regime's human rights abuses in December 1977, Pinochet called a "consultation" at the beginning of 1978, in which citizens were to vote on whether to "support President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile" against "international aggression" and to legitimize "the process of institutionalization." A "yes" was represented by a Chilean flag; a "no" by a black one. The process, marred by inherent fraud (there was no voter register) and intimidation, led to a 75% "yes" vote.

In 1980, Pinochet promulgated a constitution that retained firm military control of government. Yet Pinochet consented to having a plebiscite in eight years' time from the adoption of the constitution and his simultaneous "election" as president – he was the sole candidate – on September 11, 1980. He assumed his "re-election" in 1988 would be a foregone conclusion. Yet the stipulation for a plebiscite in 1988 led to Pinochet's undoing as Chile's dictator.

Part of Pinochet's "institutionalization" included radical economic reform, spearheaded by free

marketeers educated abroad, dubbed “the Chicago Boys.” Central to their effort to reform the Chilean economy was privatization of state assets, often at knockdown prices. Global financial markets initially responded enthusiastically, dulling the impact of denial of credits from international financial institutions. The new policies spurred an economic boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s. But the growth came to an abrupt end with a set of banking failures that led to state intervention to prop them up. The downward spiral accelerated, leading to a serious economic crisis.

Fighting the Brain Drain and Building Intellectual Capital for Change

Support to think-tanks and policy research groups, served to keep talented Chileans from joining the mass brain drain and engaged in investigating avenues to promote a return to democratic rule. Since their activities were academic in nature or packaging, there was some more leeway granted to them by the regime. “Some of the finest social science research in Latin America came to be associated with the Chilean informal academic sector,” according to Chile expert Oxford Professor Alan Angell – and it relied almost entirely on foreign funding.

Exile’s Silver Lining

The period in exile, following the catastrophic failure of Chile’s democratic institutions, was one of deep soul-searching and analysis of what could have brought on the crisis and coup. A common recognition slowly crystallized among them that functioning democracy provided the only protection for human rights, and this required a will to compromise.

While all Chilean democrats subjected themselves and their ideologies to rigorous self-criticism, the Socialists, the most numerous component of Allende’s Popular Unity government, were affected the most profoundly. According to future president Ricardo Lagos, “Never in the history of Chile have so many Chilean women and men with varied degrees of cultural exposure – social leaders, politicians, heads of local associations, and many more – move(d) into the world...exile left its imprint, leading us to recognize the value of democracy, the higher value of human rights...abandoning the classical tools of the left in the 1960s and ‘70s, to be replaced by a revalorization of democracy, of human rights, of the place of the market.” Chilean leftists developed an appreciation for European social democracy, which they once scorned.

Christian Democrats, inflexible prior to the coup, were also affected. Some left for Venezuela where they found their sister party had a different approach, valuing the virtues of compromise.

Economic Shock and Popular Reaction – Civil Society Stands Up

Protests and demonstrations began in 1983, sparked by a 14% contraction in GDP. Copper miners union leader Rodolfo Seguel organized the Workers’ National Command, and called for a National Day of Protest, which successfully conveyed public discontent to the regime for the first time since the coup. This popular discontent from below began opening society and revived political parties, which remained illegal.

Pinochet appointed rightist National Party leader Sergio Onofre Jarpa Interior Minister and authorized him to initiate an opening (“*apertura*”) for dialogue with right and centrist opposition parties.

The Catholic Church’s Cardinal Francisco Fresno convened democratic opposition in the mid-1980s to forge unity. Attempts to bind the opposition together began in 1983 with the Democratic Alliance of centrist and rightist parties. This was followed by the National Accord (*Acuerdo*) for Transition to Full

Democracy in 1985, which allied the moderate wing of the split Socialists with Christian Democrats for the first time. The Accord demanded an immediate return to democracy with free elections, and continued to reject the 1980 Constitution, with its scheduled 1988 plebiscite.

Chile's society remained divided through this period between those who saw the regime as a shield against chaos – a perception Pinochet did his best to promote, and those who saw dictatorial rule as the country's fundamental problem. According to Christian Democrat Genaro Arriagada, "There were really two worlds, two Chiles superimposed."

Demonstrations had no apparent impact. A daring 1986 attempt by leftist militants to assassinate Pinochet while leaving his country residence gave the dictator a needed pretext to violently reimpose a State of Siege, and tap into latent "middle Chilean" fears of chaos. One Chilean noted "we sank into total depression at the end of '86 because everything had failed – the communist strategy (of direct confrontation in street fights and raids) and the non-communist strategy (of demanding open elections)." There was still no strategy to end Pinochet's one-man rule.

If at First You Don't Succeed...Take Stock

In the next two years Chile's civil society and political opposition reflected, studied and debated, and developed a consensus strategy to never again allow the radical polarization that allowed military dictatorship to take hold. Chile's research institutes and think-tanks were pivotal.

Non-communist parties were legalized in 1987. Late that fall, Chilean social scientists met outside Santiago to review survey data they had collected, showing ambient fear pervasive in Chile's traumatized society. A divisive competitive electoral campaign would redound to Pinochet's advantage; he could all too easily portray it as the "chaos" he had long warned against. But a strategy of embracing the plebiscite and engaging the full democratic spectrum to generate votes for the No held promise: it could breach the fear barrier that kept Pinochet in power, allowing truly free elections to follow.

This was initially a hard sell with many politicians who felt this would be a capitulation to Pinochet and an acceptance of his illegal constitution. However, they were eventually convinced and devoted themselves to drumming-up support for the No.

Think-Tanks, Civil Society and Opposition Work Together for the NO

Civil society, policy think-tanks, and political parties aligned in a coordinated coalition to generate support for a No vote. This involved a massive nationwide grassroots effort to register citizens to vote, undertaken by the *Crusade for Citizen Participation* or (Civic Crusade), which undertook in particular to register disaffected urban youth who doubted political change could be attained without violence. The *Command for the No* established itself in offices around the country to generate support for a No vote in the plebiscite. The political opposition aligned itself for the effort in a wider spectrum than ever before – eventually 17 parties – in the *Concertacion*. The plebiscite was promoted as a referendum on the hated dictatorship.

Getting citizens to register, encouraging them to overcome fear to vote, and building confidence and hope that victory and brighter future was possible were all critical to success. Innovation and creativity were also in abundant supply. The Civic Crusade held free rock concerts with bands kept off the airwaves – 18-30 year olds needed only show their voter ID cards for entry. The free TV campaign spots were set at an hour which the regime thought would limit viewership – 23:15-23:30 nightly for the month before the vote. But these creative promotional spots were built around the Command for the No's upbeat theme:

“Joy is Coming!,” and were viewed *en masse*. “We managed to register 7 million of 8 million potential voters,” reminisced Ignacio Walker. “We spread the ‘good news’ that this plebiscite was a unique chance.”

The NOs Have It!

In the plebiscite on October 5, 1988, the No won a decisive 55%-43% victory, drawing massive turnout of over 90%. Those within the junta who resented Pinochet’s dominance welcomed the result. The air force chief acknowledged the defeat with a smile on his way in to meet his colleagues, before the official media announced the result. Pinochet had to accept the victory of the “No” which by the Constitution would require free elections for President the following year.

INTERNATIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE PINOCHET REGIME

In 1973, international reaction to the coup against Allende’s had been swift and almost uniformly negative; Swedish Premier Olaf Palme spoke for most of the democratic world when he bluntly described the junta as “despicable crooks.”

Many democracies, and a number of non-democracies, acted immediately through their embassies to protect persons seeking asylum from persecution. Over the coming months and years, thousands of Chileans were resettled all over the globe. The fact that there were so many Chilean exiles elsewhere in Latin America (particularly in Venezuela, Mexico, and Argentina – until its 1976 coup), in Europe, and in North America (mostly Canada) gave Chilean democracy advocates a wide network in academia and civil society, as well as high visibility. The Soviet bloc took in many leftist refugees through its diplomatic missions and secondary routes. Many Marxists gravitated to the Soviet Union, East Germany, and even Romania, where Ceaucescu had just become enamored of Mao’s Cultural Revolution. But even convinced Marxists found the atmosphere in the socialist bloc stifling and later opted to relocate.

Estimates of the number exiled vary widely, but it easily ran into the tens of thousands, and likely much higher. As of 1982, an estimated 44% of Chilean expatriates were in Venezuela and Mexico, with another 3% in other Latin American countries. Democratic Europe collectively was host to another nearly 40%, with the largest groups living in Spain, France, Italy, and Sweden. Canada hosted a further nearly 7%, and Australia nearly 6%. By this stage, less than 3% were living in the Soviet bloc. Paris and Rome were especially popular destinations, seen as cultural oases linguistically and politically close to home.

“European governments and parties felt a special affinity with Chile. The Chilean opposition had a concept of democracy that was clearly similar to that of most European political movements, based on a combination of fair elections, social justice, and the observance of basic human rights.” German party foundations – *Stiftungen* – were very involved in the 1980s in Chile, with the Christian Democratic *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung* estimated to have spent about 25 million Deutschmarks in Chile from 1983-1988, and its Socialist counterpart the *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung* spending almost 10 million DM.

Chile’s enviably strong network with foreign academia, politics, and civic life was sustained with openness and generosity to political refugees. Chilean Andres Zaldivar was leader of the Christian Democratic International in Spain. The Institute for the New Chile was founded by in Rotterdam. Chile Democratico, Rome-based the collaborative effort of two Christian Democrats and two Popular Unity members, published *Chile-America* from 1974-1984. It gained a worldwide readership, with informed policy debates and analysis along with human rights reporting from Chile. External funding from Western European governments kept these initiatives afloat.

Most democracies maintained consistent anti-Pinochet policies, decrying human rights abuses in international fora and supporting through various channels Chilean civil society, but some influential democracies' policies fluctuated considerably between 1973 and 1988. In addition, arms sales continued from a number of European countries. Britain's Labour governments in the 1970s curtailed arms sales withdrew their ambassador from Santiago after abuse of a British dual national, but full representation – and an end to an embargo, returned with the Conservative Thatcher government. France's policy toward Chile took a markedly more critical turn with the arrival of Socialist President Mitterand in 1981, and new arms deals were not signed. As Portugal and Spain underwent democratic transitions after the coup, the favor Caetano and Franco had showered on Pinochet turned to hostility.

Democracies also put their money where their mouths were. “In per capita terms amongst the most generous of the aid donors was the Netherlands,” according to Oxford Professor Alan Angell, who notes that the Dutch government established and funded a number of policy institutes that were incubators for Chilean exiles and experts. The Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries and Canadian IDRC were also generous.

Perhaps the most influential shifts in policy came from Washington. U.S. President Nixon and his Secretary of State Kissinger did little to hide their relief at the ouster of a government that they asserted was turning Chile into “another Cuba.” The brief Ford administration continued this, but reacted harshly to the 1976 car bombing assassination of Allende's foreign minister Orlando Letelier in downtown Washington, which killed an American citizen. The Carter administration was much harder on the Pinochet regime, co-sponsoring resolutions on human rights in the UN and applying financial levers. The Reagan administration disavowed Carter's human rights oriented policies, and welcomed a positive relationship with Pinochet. U.S. Ambassador, the political appointee and ideologue James Theberge, even attended the 11th anniversary of the coup, when other ambassadors stayed away. But this shifted definitively early in Reagan's second term, with Secretary of State George Shultz's decision in early 1985 to replace him with career diplomat Harry Barnes, Jr. Among arguments for this policy shift was the rank inconsistency of arguing for democracy in Sandinista Nicaragua while backing a blatant military dictatorship in Chile. Congress, in contrast to the White House, was consistently vocal against Pinochet, the most active and vocal of all being Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, who initiated a cutoff of military aid to Chile in 1976, and generated Congressional demands for human rights assessments on recipients of American aid.

RESOURCES AND ASSETS OF DIPLOMATS IN CHILE

In Chile, especially in the weeks after the coup, diplomats employed their **immunity** to protect human life, evidenced by Swedish Ambassador Harald Edelstam, whom Pinochet expelled, and many others. Much later, U.S. Ambassador Harry Barnes was so assertive in his efforts to help Chileans restore their democracy that Pinochet considered declaring him *persona non grata*.

Most diplomats in Santiago were able to count on the public support of their **home authorities** in opposing the regime. Ambassador Barnes lined-up comprehensive backing with the executive branch, but also major figures in Congress and NGOs. The visible backing of the higher reaches of government encourages NGOs and donors to take notice and devote more resources, confident that their efforts will be effective. This was the case in Chile.

Pinochet wanted to appear immune to **influence** by external actors, but was vulnerable to political conditionality on IFI credits. This leverage was employed repeatedly. The assertive Ambassador Harry

Barnes Jr., backed by the full U.S. government, may have lost a lot of his influence with Pinochet, but correspondingly gained it with the opposition and civil society, which had felt abandoned by regime-focused “quiet diplomacy” of the Reagan Administration’s early years. Many countries had strong moral and cultural influence on Chilean civil society, such as Venezuela with its two-party democracy and Germany’s support through the *Stiftungen*. Spanish Socialist Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez was highly regarded.

In most cases, **funds** to assist civil society and political opposition did not go through embassies, but direct channels, mostly private and quasi-public (such as the German *Stiftungen*). Ambassadors on the ground had a role in helping these donors and programmatic organizations in their targeting, and in suggesting new funding efforts – especially before the plebiscite.

The democratic states’ diplomats had a rich vein of **legitimacy** to mine in Chile – namely the full array of international human rights treaties and guarantees to which Chile had been party, enthusiastically, in its democratic and multilateralist pre-Pinochet days. The French and Dutch ambassadors referred to Chile’s obligations under the Universal Declaration on Human Rights when opposition leftists were seized in 1984. Diplomats regularly invoked them when taken to task by the regime for appearances with victims of human rights abuses, demanding information about those disappeared, and demarching the government for its transgressions of international norms.

WAYS THESE ASSETS WERE APPLIED TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN CHILE

Golden Rules

Embassies **understood** the significance of Chile’s democratic tradition, well-developed civic sector, and intelligentsia, and assisted individuals at risk by providing asylum and economic assistance, as well as direct assistance to those attempting to keep the embers of freedom alive in the smothering first years of dictatorship, though there was too little space for progress for almost a decade after the coup. The Church was the main protector and non-state actor, through the Pro-Peace Committee and its successor, the Vicariate of Solidarity.

Chile’s strong cadre of academics, professionals and intellectuals had studied abroad and had wide networks well before the coup. Many suffered persecution, including expulsion from their positions in academia and administration, and consequently left Chile for positions overseas, leaving Chilean academia decimated. The international community recognized the necessity of maintaining this human resource in Chile, and numerous donors, some public and many private, helped maintain a lifeline for them by financing academic policy research institutes. In addition, diplomats such as Ambassador Barnes **respected** Chilean civil society by publicly engaging them upon his arrival. Barnes met publicly with Christian Democrat leader Gabriel Valdes soon after presenting his credentials to Pinochet, and with civil society figures in advance of introductions to Pinochet’s officialdom which riled Pinochet greatly. The optics and reality of an ambassador **listening** to civil society were important in rebuilding civic self-confidence and optimism. Valdes noted at the time “The embassy has changed completely for us.”

Though there was little systematic information **sharing** among diplomatic missions, there were *ad hoc* examples of collaboration in protecting threatened Chileans, especially in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 coup. Diplomatic missions certainly interacted and compared notes regularly with the other international actors on the Chilean scene: political party foundations, international labor union representatives, the international press corps, etc. Later, Ambassador Barnes created and headed a “Western Hemisphere democracy group” including the Argentine, Brazilian, and Costa Rican

Ambassadors. According to Barnes, “We exchanged information and discussed how we (and our governments) might be more effective in promoting greater respect for human rights and democracy.” The French Ambassador, Leon Bouvier, was also a strong advocate for human rights and democracy.

Truth in Communications

Immediately after the coup, embassy **reporting** was vital to convey the severity of violence and repression. With access to information utterly closed at the outset, and still restrictive even at the most liberal stage of the Pinochet regime, this transmission mechanism was important. Evidence of the massive human rights abuses endemic to Pinochet’s regime often reached the international public – and Chileans – through this channel.

Informing the Chilean public of their solidarity and policies was nearly impossible with the self-censorship of non-government vetted media, though publications by expatriates, such as *Chile-America* out of Rome, received assistance.

The diplomatic pouch was among many tools Chilean human rights activists could rely upon to convey details of human rights abuses to the international community. Once safely outside and reported, this information could circulate back to Chilean society at large through foreign broadcast media and expatriate publications, conveying the truth about the regimes dark practices.

As space for independent media opened in the 1980s, diplomats directed assistance to independent media, such as *Analisis*, *La Epoca*, and CIEPLAN’s popular economic review. The crucial advertisements for the “No” in 1988 were funded by the U.S., with Ambassador Barnes’ direct engagement, and some Western European political parties. And Italian Ambassador Michelangelo Pisani ensured that despite the regime’s declaration of RAI 2 television journalist Alberto la Volpe as *persona non grata* due to prior reporting, he was admitted to cover the December 1989 election that ended Pinochet’s rule.

Working with the Government

From the beginning of his 16 years in power in 1973 to the end in 1989, Pinochet was an international pariah, rarely leaving the country. Few invitations were forthcoming. In 1980, Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos disinvited Pinochet from a planned state visit while Pinochet was en route to Manila. Pinochet was once again humiliated in 1983, when his government announced it was invited to the inauguration of Argentina’s democratic president, Raul Alfonsin, only to have the Argentine Foreign Ministry disavow the invitation, which Pinochet extracted from Argentina’s outgoing junta. Sweden made a point of not inviting any Chilean representative to assassinated Premier Olaf Palme’s funeral in 1986.

Following the coup, Italy withdrew its ambassador, maintaining a charge’ in Santiago until after Pinochet was defeated in the plebiscite. Sweden never replaced its ambassador, expelled in December 1973 for his active defense of human rights. Mexico abandoned relations altogether from 1974 on, after taking in a great number of refugees, including President Allende’s widow. Britain withdrew its ambassador in 1975; he was not replaced for over four years.

While relations remained open with a number of democracies represented in Santiago, there was precious little **advising** of the Pinochet government. Nor were there noteworthy examples of government-to-government **dialoguing** on human rights and democratic practices, though there were protests from democracies.

Most of the state-to-state communications in the Pinochet dictatorship period are more properly

considered **demarching**, such as demands for explanations of actions, pressure to release prisoners or explain “disappearances.” French Ambassador Leon Bouvier demanded explanation of the killing of a French priest by police in a poor Santiago barrio. The previous year he was recalled for consultations by Foreign Minister Cheysson, who called Pinochet a “curse on his people,” to protest human rights violations. Ambassador Barnes warned the Pinochet regime not to interfere with the 1988 plebiscite.

Reaching Out

Diplomats forged **connections** between Chilean civil society and opposition political figures and counterparts in their home countries as a matter of course, recognizing that creating and maintaining linkages to the outside world was essential. The web connecting Chile to the democratic world developed into an incredibly strong and resilient one. Diplomats interacted consistently with Chilean civil society and complimented the efforts of their own societies to remain engaged.

Democratic embassies – particularly those of Canada and a number of European countries – regularly invited opposition and civic figures to **convene** for free discussions amongst themselves and the diplomatic corps (which, of course, would tap into this resource for reporting on the situation). This circuit, together with connections which were forged among refugees abroad, developed into a network which proved very important later in planning the return to democracy.

As the repression loosened somewhat in the early and mid-1980s, the diplomatic corps worked to **facilitate** greater cooperation among the democratic opposition parties. In May 1985, Chilean official media reported the West German Ambassador stating that his country, along with Britain and the U.S., was willing to mediate between Pinochet’s government and the opposition, which had become emboldened by public discontent. Soon thereafter, Ambassador Barnes arrived and pressed opposition politicians to come together behind a common approach to press for an end to dictatorship. But despite progress in building constructive relationships among parties, there was no clear strategy until late 1987 and early 1988.

Post-disbursed funds were not a major feature of international engagement, but **financing** by governments, quasi-governmental organization and private foundations was indispensable for the survival and development of Chilean civil society.

Embassies ensured that worthy efforts got noticed, and this lifeline gave Chilean civil society the ability to develop their winning strategy of contesting the plebiscite.

In just one example, the U.S. government had hitherto been far less engaged in financially supporting civil society than its European counterparts, mostly operating through development agencies and quasi-governmental institutes. But Ambassador Barnes, who helped encourage consensus among the opposition since his arrival, ensured that the No campaign was adequately resourced. The U.S. Agency for International Development funded the Civic Crusade, and the National Endowment for Democracy and National Democratic Institute both assisted the Command for the No.

The most effective **showcasing** of democratic practices and norms was done outside Chile. Chile’s tens of thousands of political and intellectual exiles experienced free democratic societies themselves, some after having had the opportunity to see firsthand the “advanced socialism” of the Soviet bloc. The honeymoon in the socialist paradise was brief for most. Allende’s own secretary, who like many socialists originally fled to East Germany, later said “I jumped the wall,” and was attracted to Paris by France’s socialist government under President Francois Mitterand. Mitterand and Italian Communist Party leader Enrico Berlinguer, progenitor of democratic “Eurocommunism,” were attractive poles for the exiled Chilean left.

Embassies held regular cultural events that displayed the fruits of an open, democratic society.

Defending Democrats

Democratic diplomats regularly and creatively **demonstrated** their support for democratic principles, fundamental freedoms, and human rights in Chile throughout the Pinochet era. Initially, this was accomplished most urgently through providing humanitarian protection to those threatened with death or torture by the regime (see below). Later, diplomats like Carter-era U.S. Ambassador George Landau made clear on his arrival in 1977 that “We can’t tell a government what it can do, but we can tell it what will happen if it doesn’t do certain things.” Recalls of ambassadors were legion in Chile: Mexico severed relations, Sweden never replaced Ambassador Edelstam after he was expelled, Italy didn’t reinstitute full ties until after Pinochet was shown the door by voters in 1988, and Britain and France recalled their ambassadors in protests during Pinochet’s reign.

Other notable examples were the appearance of a host of democracies’ diplomats, including those of France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and the U.S., at the funeral of a young man burned to death by police in 1986. The young woman who was with him was also severely burned, but survived, and was given asylum and treated in Montreal, Canada.

Attending events by the opposition, even when it remained illegal, showed the regime that the democratic world recognized these activities as inherently legitimate, not only affording Chilean democrats some insulation from repression, but also showing the democratic world was with them. The same principle applied to human rights events, at which democratic ambassadors and other diplomats made a point to be visible. The political use of forced exile by the regime was also publicly derided, even as Pinochet tried to earn point by incrementally allowing some exiles to return from the mid-1980s on. As one western diplomat stated “exile is not a question of numbers, it is a question of principle. Even one exile is too many.”

Diplomats also encouraged Chilean democrats in their conviction that victory in the plebiscite was not only possible, but likely if the regime did not interfere. “I think the ‘No’ will win, if the process doesn’t get interrupted,” said Ambassador Barnes two days before the vote.

Democracies were very active in **protecting** Chileans (and other Latin Americans) threatened by the regime. The most vivid examples of this activity should be viewed through a primarily humanitarian lens, in the period immediately following the coup. The National Refugee Commission (CONAR) was set-up by leading church figures to get threatened persons to foreign embassies where they could be protected. The stories are quite harrowing and vivid.

Swedish Ambassador Harald Edelstam said at the time that “the role of the Swedish Embassy is to save the lives of people who are in danger. We know there are lists of people who supported the former regime and who are considered by the new military authorities (to be) criminals and therefore could be executed.” Edelstam took the entire Cuban Embassy staff under his protection, and escorted them to an Aeroflot flight out of Chile. New Zealand’s Ambassador, John McArthur, spirited a trade union leader disguised as a woman to the residence before arranging for the Swedish Embassy to arrange for his asylum. While later protecting a Uruguayan woman who had just undergone surgery, Edelstam got in a confrontation with police and was expelled. Mexican Ambassador Gonzalo Martinez Corbala gave refuge to more than 500 at the embassy and residence. In later testimony to Spanish prosecutors who indicted Pinochet, he noted many of those he sheltered bore signs of torture inflicted at the National Stadium. Two attempted asylees were shot in the back by police at the embassy door.

Immediately after the coup, roughly 50 terrorized Chileans and foreign nationals likely to be persecuted

by the regime came to the door of the Canadian Embassy seeking asylum. Without instructions the young diplomats admitted the Chileans, who remained in the chancery of the embassy until the Canadian government could evacuate them and their families two months later. Venezuela dispatched a plane to get Allende-era foreign minister Orlando Letelier after his release in 1974.

Diplomats continued to act throughout the dictatorship to protect Chileans. Though the massive wave of refugees naturally followed the coup and immediate repression, as late as December 1987 there were more than 500 requests for asylum per month, mostly to Sweden, with large numbers also to Canada and neighboring (and by then democratic) Argentina.

Through holding public meetings with human rights defenders and other threatened Chileans, diplomats granted an element of protection to them.

The Chilean Catholic Church, and the Church-backed Vicariate of Solidarity and those operating under its protection performed the most important acts of **witnessing, verifying**, investigating and documenting the crimes and human rights violations of the Pinochet regime.

Diplomats performed this role as well in the immediate aftermath of the coup, availing themselves of their immunity to find some of the missing and protect a great number of Chileans and foreign nationals who were sought by the regime in its “State of War.” Their reports not only went back to their governments, but frequently to the world at large through the media, generating international outrage.

Chileans planning the No campaign determined early on that election observation during the plebiscite would be essential. Many felt the regime was fully capable of killing to maintain power. Foreign observers “helped (Chileans) feel they could vote with impunity.” Genaro Arriagada, a Christian Democrat scholar who headed the Technical Committee for the No believed that international observers were the “best guarantee” against fraud, or worse – against a move by the regime to maintain power through “disappearing” electoral workers and voters. “Their mere presence in the country is a guarantee...an insurance. That function is invaluable.” Ambassador Barnes and his colleagues, especially from Latin America, ensured that the observers came – roughly 400 of them, officially as “tourists.” High-profile international observers included U.S. Senators Edward Kennedy and Richard Lugar, as well as former Presidents Carter and Ford. “Had the eyes of the world not been on Chile and had there not been international observers for the plebiscite, than I think that Pinochet in any number of ways would have gotten away with it,” thought the U.S. DCM, George Jones. And so the democratic world kept the pressure on Pinochet to ensure that the 1989 elections were held.

CONCLUSION

Diplomats – and their complex open societies back home – played a role in Chile’s democratic revival. But the success of the No campaign by Chile’s civil society, intellectuals, and democratic opposition to Pinochet was owed to domestic initiative, strategy, and pragmatism.

The latter element had been a traditional feature of Chile’s democratic practice, but was effaced by doctrinaire ideologies in the 1960s. Most Chileans attribute the democratic breakdown in 1973 to domestic factors, despite foreign influence in the 1960s and 1970s. But the experience of losing democracy and its mechanisms to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms for nearly two decades has informed Chilean society. Former President Ricardo Lagos states that “there is one consensus today shared by everyone: ‘never again.’ Never again can Chile repeat it...that rupture in Chile’s soul. Never again”.